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ABSTRACT
HIGH-SPEED RAIL SAFETY ANALYSIS BASED ON
DUAL-WEIGHTED COMPLEX NETWORK
by
Liu Lv
This study uses a complex network model to analyze the causes of accidents in High-Speed
Rail operations. By identifying the key factors that led to High-Speed Rail accidents,
hidden safety hazards were discovered. This will help improve the operational safety of the
U.S. High-Speed Rail line under construction.
The analysis uses the regional High-Speed Rail network in Guangzhou, China as a
case study, including the railway (including High-Speed Rail) accidents that occurred in
the company's jurisdiction from 2013 to 2017. With comparative analysis between general
railways and High-Speed Rail, the changes of High-Speed Rail safety factors are explored.
Data analysis results show that the main accident causes of High-Speed Rail and general
railways have no significant differences in categories, Equipment and human factors are
the most important categories of factors leading to accidents. However, there are obvious
differences in specific accident factors. Which include the significant impact of driver staff
on the safety of High-Speed Rail, and the safety of High-Speed Rail is highly sensitive to
incidents. Another key factor is the stability of the equipment, especially the performance
of the signal system is critical to the operation of High-Speed Rail. The underlying reasons
reflected by these safety defect factors include:
1. In the short term, a large number of equipment purchases and the construction
of new railway lines will cause maintenance, driver, and mechanic pressures
and staff shortages.

2. The weakness of the internal training system leads to insufficient professional
quality of maintenance staff and driver.
The proposed strategy includes enhancing the training organization within the
operating company, and adjusting the High-Speed Rail construction and equipment
procurement policies should be gentler in order to reduce the pressure on the system and
improve the level of safety.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
Safety is the most basic requirement of mankind, and ranks only second to physiological
needs in Maslow's theory of needs. As a basic requirement of transportation in daily life,
safety is not so easy to achieve: The statistics of the World Health Organization in 2016
show (as shown in Table 1.1). Traffic (road) injuries rank 5th among the causes of human
death. The number of people killed in traffic accidents is as high as 82 thousand people per
day.

1

Table 1.1 Cause of Death Around Worldwide
Rank

DALYs
(000s)

Cause

0

All Causes

1

Ischaemic heart disease

2

2,668,476

DALYs per
% DALYs
100,000
population
100.0

35,761

203,700

7.6

2,730

Stroke

137,941

5.2

1,849

3

Lower respiratory infections

129,690

4.9

1,738

4

Preterm birth complications

101,397

3.8

1,359

5

Road injury

82,538

3.1

1,106

6

Diarrhoeal diseases

81,743

3.1

1,095

7

Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

72,512

2.7

972

8

Diabetes mellitus

65,666

2.5

880

9

Birth asphyxia and birth trauma

63,928

2.4

857

62,980

2.4

844

10 Congenital anomalies
Source: WHO, 2016.

Road accidents bring not only the loss of lives and families, but also huge economic
losses. According to the estimates of the United Nations, the global property damage
caused by road accidents is as high as 518 billion US dollars each year. Road traffic injury
losses in EU countries are 180 billion euros per year, which is twice the annual budget for
all activities in these countries (European Transport Safety Council, 2003). US road traffic
injury losses are approximately US $ 230.6 billion per year, or 2.3% of GNP. Some studies
in the 1990s estimated that road traffic injury losses in the UK were 0.5% of gross domestic
product (GDP), Sweden was 0.9%, and Italy was 2.8%; 11 high-income countries had road
traffic injury losses averaged 1.4% of GDP (Elvik R, 2002). In 1999, China ’s road traffic
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injuries resulted in an estimated loss of US $ 12.5 billion, almost four times the country ’s
annual health budget. (Zhou Y et al. 2003)
It is the high and painful cost of traffic accidents that make safety research an
eternal theme in transportation research. Countless talented scholars focus on traffic
safety research, and the number of papers included in TRID alone exceeds 5,000 each
year. Outside the university, NGOs and governments are driving improvements in traffic
safety in various fields, including promoting the use of seat belts, controlling the use of
illegal drugs or driving after alcohol, improving car safety, improving road signs, and
recently starting to improve Problems with cell phone usage while driving. Countries
’financial investment in traffic safety is also huge: Safety research throughout all
transportation programs remains US DOT's number one priority. The Fixing America's
Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act). providing estimated average annual funding of
$ 2.3172 billion for Highway Safety Improvement Program for lase five years.(FHWA,
2020) As a full-time federal agency responsible for highway safety in the United States,
the National Highway Safety Administration NHTSA has a budget of 966.3 million US
dollars (2019), The federal motor carrier safety administration FMCSA has a budget of
666.8 million US dollars. The federal Railway Administration FRA's has a budget of
221.7 million dollars. From 2004 to 2013, China invested 25.4 billion RMB in highway
safety improvement, renovated 22,000 dangerous bridges, and spent 44 billion RMB.
(Zhenglin Feng, 2013) Sweden proposed “Zero Vision” in 1997 (Trafikverket, 2015)
extending the responsibility of road safety from road users to designers and engineers of
road systems. Today, the vision expressed by “Zero Vision” to improve traffic safety
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regardless of cost has been adopted by many countries. It is these joint efforts that make
travel more and more safe.
As another important mode of transportation, railway safety is also an area that
transportation scholars cannot ignore. Despite the declining trend, railway transportation
is still an important option of transportation, especially in Europe, India, China, and even
parts of the United States. Even in the United States, railways still play an important role
as commuting tools in local areas. NJ Transit, which operates in New Jersey, has 32%
of its passengers, and about 140,000 people commute between New Jersey and New
York City on the NJTRANSIT rail network on weekdays. (NJ Transit, 2019) The safety
of the railway is related to millions of passengers and those high cost of infrastructure.
As an emerging transportation mode, the emergence of High-Speed Rail has
greatly improved the transportation efficiency and increased economic value of the
railway network. Passengers move on the rails between cities at unprecedented speeds,
which can reach three to four times the speed of the highway. In some regions, the
emergence of High-Speed Rail as a market competitor has reduced the market share of
aviation. The extension of railroad tracks, the expansion of the network, the surge in
passengers, the significant reduction in travel time, but the hidden safety risks are also
rising at the same time. Ten years after the September 11th incident, in 2011, the highspeed developing High-Speed Rail in China encountered its own September 11th
incident. The two high-speed trains collided due to the failure of the signal system. The
accident killed 40 people and injured 200 people. The economic loss is estimated to be
193,716,500 (RMB). (State Council of China, 2011) The pause button of China’s HighSpeed Rail construction has been pressed because of this accident, and also the operating
4

speed of entire High-Speed Rail national network has been reduced by 50km / h in the
next few years. Subsequently, Spain and Taiwan had successive High-Speed Rail
accidents in 2013 (Karl Penhaul, 2013) and 2018 (Taiwan Railways Administration,
2019), the number of casualties exceeded 200. High-Speed Rail safety research is
already an urgent need, and few articles have been published in academia.
Accident research is an important step to improve safety. The investigator found
the cause and process of the accident through post-event investigation and analysis, and
explored the possibility of improving safety, hoping to avoid similar accidents in future
operations. Statistics play an effective tool in exploring the law of accident occurrence.
The time, place, trend, accident damage, and accident cause of the accident can be found
in the statistics. But Railways, especially High-Speed Rail, are a technically complex
transportation system. In modern socially complex railway systems, the cause of
accidents cannot be isolated as single human error or technical function failure, but a
mixture of personnel, technology, machinery, equipment, policies, management, and
environmental factors. Therefore, statistical analysis in the traditional sense can no
longer meet the needs of new situations. Various types of accidents propose models has
been explored to explain the cause of the accident, and the most widely used model is
called the system accident model. Recently, complex network model that has been born
out of one of the branches of mathematics, "graph theory", has been applied to the
analysis of accident causes after improved by scholars. The combination of the system
accident model and the complex network model is to the great benefit for the in-depth
study of the cause of the accident, and for providing specific and targeted safety
improvement suggestions.
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1.2 Problem Statement
Railway (especially High-Speed Rail) safety research has been ignored for a long time.
Known research is focused on level-crossing, but it can also be seen as part of traffic safety.
After all, car damage is more serious in this type of accident. The safety of the railway is
much better than road since the total number of road accidents is far more than railway
accidents. But compared to the “zero vision” plan for road safety, the number of deaths on
the rails is unacceptable. The Figure 1.1 shows the number of railway accident deaths in
China and UK. UK has 250 of deaths due to railway accidents each year. (RSSB, 2019)
China's railway safety is improving year by year, but nearly 900 people still die from
railway accidents every year. (National Railway Administration, 2011-2018)
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Figure 1.1 Statistics of railway deaths in China and U.K.
Source: China State Railway Group Company, Ltd. 2011-2018. UK National Railway Administration,
2011-2018.

The content of the chart shows that although the number of railway accidents is
small, it does not mean that railway safety can be ignored. However, due to its nature of
public transportation, a single accident may have profound impact on human lives,
environment, and passenger perceptions. Especially with the development of High-Speed
Rail, high-speed brings not only the reduction of travel time, but also the dangerous
magnification. Table 1.2 lists the traffic accidents that have occurred since the operation of
the High-Speed Rail. it is necessary to analyze accidents associated with High-Speed Rail
operations, identify causing factors and reduce and eliminate any damage, if possible. This
is what every country that operates High-Speed Rail and countries that want to develop
this technology should be concerned about, and also transportation Security researchers
cannot ignore the subject.
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Table 1.2 High-Speed Rail Accident Cases
Year

Location

Accident

Fatalities

Injuries

1998

German-Eschede

Derailment

101

88

2011

China-Wenzhou

Collision

40

210

2013

Spanish-Santiago de Compostela

Derailment

79

140

2015

French-Eckwersheim

Derailment

11

42

2018

China-Taiwan

Derailment

18

215

2018

Turkey-Ankara

Collision

9

84

The rapid development of High-Speed Rail and the expanding network have led to
an increasing number of stakeholders in safety research. As the latest development of
railway technology, High-Speed Rail has become the mainstream development trend of the
railway passenger transport market. Figure 1.2 summaries the High-Speed Rail develop
plan around world. In continental Europe, the total length of High-Speed Rail in Spanish
(ADIF, 2019) and France exceed 2500 kilometers, (Mengke Chen,2014) and the length of
High-Speed Rail lines under planning / construction has reached thousands of kilometers.
The United Kingdom is investing £ 56.6 billion in the construction of the High Speed 2
High-Speed Rail line, with a maximum speed of 400 kilometers per hour. The High-Speed
Rail in Turkey, Thailand and India are all planned and are already under construction.
(UIC, 2019) In addition to the Acela rapid train system, the United States is also building
the first 800-mile High-Speed Rail to connect San Francisco and Los Angeles with an
operating speed of 350 kilometers per hour. (California High-Speed Rail Authority, 2008)
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Figure 1.2 High-Speed Rail development and planning development in countries around
the world.

In China, the country with the largest High-Speed Rail network in the world, more
than half of the passenger capacity has been occupied by High-Speed Rail of the entire
railway network. This shows the trend of China's High-Speed Rail mileage and passenger
capacity from 2013 to 2018. (National Railway Administration, 2014-2019) The land on
which thousands of kilometers of High-Speed Rail lines are located, fixed asset
investments starting at tens of billions of dollars, are as safe stakeholders as the passengers
on the train. Especially in the capital market, High-Speed Rail has become an important
asset of listed companies. The Shinkansen of Japan completed the IPO as early as 1997.
The Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail, China's busiest High-Speed Rail line, completed
the IPO in 2019 with a market value of more than 300 billion (RMB) (Figure 1.3). The
success of the IPO indicates that the value of the High-Speed Rail has been recognized by
the market, but it also means that the operator needs to minimize the accident rate of the
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railway operation, because any accident will affect the rights and interests of the operator
directly.

Figure 1.3 Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail stock information.
Source: Wall Street Journal, 2020.

Although the development of High-Speed Rail is so rapid, the safety research
around High-Speed Rail is still lacking. Some studies are directed at specific accidents,
such as the 7.23 train collision accident in China, but there is little overall research on the
safety characteristics of High-Speed Rail. In particular, there is no study comparing HighSpeed Rail with traditional railways. We need to know what are the unique characteristics
of High-Speed Rail accidents compared to traditional railways, and where are more
accidents occurring? Is it a station or a line? Bridge or tunnel? What happened to the cause
of the accident? Which factor is more important, human factors and machinery? Are the
traditional management and risk control mechanisms still effective? Does the traditional
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maintenance policy need to be changed? These are the problems that researchers need to
solve.
China is a good case to study the safety characteristics of traditional railways and
High-Speed Rail. China's High-Speed Rail developed later compared to Japan and
Germany. In 2008, China's first real High-Speed Rail began to operate before the opening
of the Olympic Games. Today China has built the largest High-Speed Rail network with
more than 32,000 kilometers of tracks and transported more than 1.73 billion passengers
yearly during the past decade. (Figure 1.4) As a widely accepted human feat, the HighSpeed Rail development has not only propelled China into the leadership position in
railway transport but also state led technology transferring processes, not to mention the
vast improvement to the travel conditions in China. At the same time, China also maintains
the world's largest electrified railway network. There are 3.375 billion passengers per year,
of which High-Speed Rail accounts for 2/3. As a large-scale network that has both
conventional and High-Speed Rail, we can call it a hybrid network, and in a country with
two modes of rapid transition, China can as an excellent case for observing the security
features of a hybrid railway network.
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Figure 1.4 China High-Speed Rail development chronology.
Source: China State Railway Group Company, Ltd. 2019.

Knowledge in academia also needs to be reviewed under new conditions.
Traditional statistical methods, system control theory, and other qualitative and
quantitative analysis tools all require new case evidence. There have been scholars
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analyzing the medical complex network theory in railway accidents, but they are all
analyzing regular railway accidents and lack of High-Speed Rail accidents. Moreover, the
degree of accident injury is not taken into account by the original theoretical analysis tools,
which is also the potential for the theoretical development of research tools.

1.3 Objective and Work Scope
The objective of the study is to use High-Speed Rail accidents in China as a case study, use
complex network models to study the main causes of High-Speed Rail accidents, discover
the safety risks in High-Speed Rail operations, and hope to help to improve the safety of
High-Speed Rail, those operating worldwide Under construction and planning.
The scope of the study is mainly based on accidents in the Chinese railway network,
and the geographical scope is limited to the three southern provinces: Guangdong, Hunan,
and Hainan. The time frame of the accident is five years, 2013-2017.

1.4 Organization
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 emphasizes the importance of
railway safety as background knowledge, and introduces the problems of railway (and
High-Speed Rail) safety research. Chapter 2 summarizes the current research achievements
of High-Speed Rail, especially safety research. The history of accident research and the
application of complex network models in accident research are also introduced. Chapter
3 introduces the dual-weighted complex network model. Chapter 4 explains the reasons
why the case study chooses Chinese railways, and gives an overall description of the data
collected. Chapter 5 records the establishment process of DWCN. Chapter 6 analyzes the
13

mathematical characteristics of the network. Chapter 7 discusses the major safety hazards
of China Railways and High-Speed Rail. Chapter 8 summarizes the research results and
future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews the literature on High-Speed Rail and safety research. The first part
reviews the main achievements of High-Speed Rail research, and the second part reviews
the development of traffic safety research theory and mainstream analysis models. Then
the development of complex network model theory and its application in traffic safety
research have been reviewed.

2.1 Safety Research
As stated by USDOT, Safety is the Department of Transportation ’s (DOT) highest priority.
Similarly, security research is also the most important subject in academia. In the TRID
database, more than 5000 articles about traffic safety are included every year. This figure
only counts articles published in English. Research in the field of security has a long
history, according to Zobair and KazuhikoAn (2017) who summarized the history of
accident theory is classified into the following categories:
1. Statistical analysis and trends
2. Risk analysis
3. Domino theory
4. Epidemiologic theory
5. Control and system theoretic models
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2.1.1 Statistical Analysis and Trends
Because of the nature of accident analysis, research is only possible after an accident has
occurred. Data analysis, as the most basic scientific research method, exists throughout the
history of accident research. From Vernon, who first applied statistical analysis to
industrial accident analysis, to the latest complex network accident analysis model,
statistical characteristics not only show the frequency of accidents under different time and
space conditions, but also allow researchers to find out the occurrence of accidents depends
on various factors such as internal and external factors (Vernon, 1918).
2.1.2 Risk Analysis
Through the development of statistical methods, Watson (1961) introduced the fault tree
analysis (FTA) method to accident analysis. The so-called fault tree analysis method is to
set certain risk control options (RCO) to quantify certain risk values. Through deductive
analysis of known types of faults, understand how the system fails, determine the accident
rate at different levels and find the best way to reduce risk. The emergence of fault tree
analysis methods has made risk analysis popular in accident analysis. The main
disadvantage of quantitative risk analysis is that it is impossible to predict how an accident
will occur, so researchers in accident analysis have found another research method, domino
theory.
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2.1.3 Domino Theory

Figure 2.1 Accident development process at Domino Theory.
Source: Heinrich, 1931.

Domino's metaphor is very visual and intuitively points out that the accident is not
isolated, but the result of a series of events. Heinrich (1931) likened the process of accidents
to five categories: ancestry and social environment, personal fault, unsafe act, accident and
injury. Dominoes metaphorically describes the logical relationship between social
environment and personal factors in an accident. The diagram at Figure 2.1 clearly shows
this relationship.
In the first version of this model, published in 1931, the five factors identified were:
1. Domino 1: ancestry and the worker’s social environment, which impact the
worker’s skills, beliefs and “traits of character”, and thus the way in which
they perform tasks
2. Domino 2: the worker’s carelessness or personal faults, which lead them to
pay insufficient attention to the task (see box about “accident-proneness”
theory)
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3. Domino 3: an unsafe act or a mechanical/physical hazard, such as a worker
error (standing under suspended loads, starting machinery without
warning…) or a technical equipment failure or insufficiently protected
machinery
4. Domino 4: the accident
5. Domino 5: injuries or loss, the consequences of the accident

Figure 2.2 Accident prevention method based on Domino Theory.
Source: Heinrich, 1931.

Domino theory also intuitively provides a way to organize accidents: cut off the
event transmission chain, as shown in the Figure 2.2.
The disadvantage of this model is that it is too simple for today's generally complex
technology and organization to be a useful tool to help understand the cause of the accident.
It uses a purely linear and mechanical model of causality, which is inappropriate in
complex systems. In complex systems, accidents are usually caused by many interacting,
partially competitive and unpredictable factors.
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2.1.4 Epidemiologic Theory
Epidemiological theory is designed to explain infectious diseases and the environment, but
has been extended to accident research. The theory focuses on causality between
environmental factors and accidents. The theory assumes that if accidents are public health
problem, safety issues can be addressed in ways and techniques that have proven useful for
large-scale disease problems. The theory is that the cause of the accident was found to exist
in agents, hosts and the environment. As show in the Figure 2.3. Haddon (1968) proposed
a two-dimensional matrix in 1968 to determine the chronological order of hosts, pathogens,
and environmental factors and to help determine preventive measures. (Table 2.1) The
diagram shows the basic structure of the matrix: rows equivalent to the event phase and
columns representing the epidemic triad of the host, pathogen, and environment. Preaccident and accident units are full of factors contributing to the accident or potential
factors of the expected accident. Controls that help prevent similar incidents are described
in the cells after the incident. The matrix provides a tool that can be used to motivate people
to think about the vulnerabilities and triggers that led to an event, or to develop a prevention
strategy.

19

Table 2.1 Diagnostic Tool Based on Epidemiological Theory
Host/personal
factors

Agent/vector Physical environment Social environment
factors
factors
factors

Preincident
incident
Postincident
Source: Haddon, 1972.

Figure 2.3 Relationship between host, agency and environment.
Source: Haddon, 1972.
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2.1.5 Control and System Theoretic Models
Control theory is mainly used in complex dynamic systems. Because the external input of
the system is in an unstable state, the system needs to process the input by controlling
internal variables, so that the system output is stable and in line with expectations.
Since the Industrial Revolution, especially since the 1970s, the complexity of
technology and organization has grown exponentially. Computers, CNC machine tools,
and other large mechanical / electronic equipment have tens of thousands of parts. Large
Stella organizations such as multinational companies have also reached the highest level
of human knowledge in terms of business scope and geographical span. Taking into
account the complex inside the system interactions (technical or organizational) and a large
number of unavoidable accidents, Perrow (1984) proposed a term "normal accident" as a
characteristic of the system.
2.1.6 FRAM Model
Through the study of complex systems, people began to think that failure and success have
the same root cause. The functional resonance analysis method or FRAM (Hollnagel, 2004
and 2012) provides a method to describe the results. This method uses the concept of
resonance: Unstable and gradually increasing resonance of performance. FRAM analysis
includes five basic steps:
1. Identify and describe basic system functions.
2. Check the model for completeness or consistency.
3. Describe the potential variability of functions in the FRAM model.
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4. Functional resonance is defined in terms of dependencies / couplings between
functions and the possibility of mutation.
5. Identify methods for monitoring resonance development to control system
development.

The spirit of FRAM is the following four basic principles:
1. The Principle of Equivalence of Successes and Failures
The theory believe that things go right and wrong in basically the same way. The
fact that the outcomes are different does not mean that the underlying processes must be
different.
2. The Principle of Approximate Adjustments
Many systems are complex, and the operating conditions will not always be stable
in a state that perfectly meets the needs. Therefore, individuals and organizations usually
adjust their performance to meet existing conditions. This adjustment makes performance
and system conditions in a state of approximate adjustment, so the system will produce
correct or wrong outputs.
3. The Principle of Emergence
The variability of normal performance is rarely enough to cause an accident, but
the variability of different components may overlap in various ways leading to a sharp
increase in non-linearity. Therefore, differences in system output cannot be predicted or
explained by studying the performance of specific components.
4. The Principle of Functional Resonance
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The variability of one function is affected and enhanced by another function,
which is called resonance in machinery. The existence of resonance can abnormally
increase the variability of a function, and this increase is not a simple causal relationship
or a linear superposition relationship.
Overall, FRAM provides a comprehensive understanding of the system's work,
emphasizing a more comprehensive perspective than previous research methods. But as
a qualitative method, quantitative analysis cannot be performed, which is the
disadvantage of this theory.
2.1.7 STAMP Model
The core of STAMP theory is the control and feedback loop composed of constraints. It
believes that the occurrence of the accident is due to the loss of control (such as
technology, engineering, management or organization, etc.) and the constraint failure in
the feedback loop. As shown in the Figure 2. 4 is a basic control and feedback loop.
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Figure 2.4 Control and feedback loop at STAMP Model.
Source: Leveson, 2011.

The basic concept of STAMP is to model the system structure, then identify the
control and feedback loops related to safe operation, and then determine which controls
and which constraints have failed to cause the accident, which means that the safe
operation has lost control. As shown in the Figure 2.5, the control structure of STAMP
is divided into two models at two levels, one for system development and one for
operation. Constraints can be existing constraints (such as environmental or financial
constraints) or external constraints (such as regulations) introduced.
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Figure 2.5 Two levels for STAMP Model.
Source: Leveson, 2011.

2.2 Complex Network Model
Complex network theory is a new and vital theory. The foundation of a complex network
is the network topology in mathematics. Topology is the mathematical nature of a network
that does not depend on the location of nodes and the specific shape of edges. It also means
that topology only focuses on whether there are edges connected between nodes in the
network, and ignores the position of nodes and the length, shape, and whether edges
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intersect with each other. Traditional mathematicians use the grid in Euclidean geometry
to simulate the relationship of various factors in the system, and there are fixed connections
between the nodes.
2.2.1 Random Network
The Erdős–Rényi model published in 1959 established the ER model. The model G (n, M)
(Erdős and Rényi, 1959) or G (n, p) (Edgar Gilbert, 1959). The former indicates that n
points and M edges form a network G, and the latter indicates that n points interact with
each other with a probability of P. connection. The model simulates a random network
structure, but the problem is that the connection probability of nodes in the actual network
is not fixed. Moreover, the clustering coefficient in the ER model is low.

Figure 2.6 Different between regular and Random Network.
Source: Xuhong Liao, 2017.
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2.2.2 Small World Network
In 1998, Watts and Strogatz established a small-world model, which also has a smaller
average shortest path length and a high clustering coefficient. In reality, many networks
conform to the characteristics of the small world model. For example, the WWW network
can be regarded as a small world network composed of computers (nodes) and network
cables (edges) (Watts D J, 1998). Similar networks include electric power network
(Faloutsos M, 1997), social relationship network (Hofman J M, 2017), transportation
network (Preston, 2015), neural network (Huang, 2019), etc.

Figure 2.7 Network sample for Small World Network.
Source: Reka Albert, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, 2002.

Jon Kleinberg developed the W-S-K model based on the W-S model, and
introduced the q coefficient (clustering exponent) to control the connection between nodes
and the distance between nodes. The model is used to search for the shortest path, such as
information transfer and message delivery in social networks.
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2.2.3 Scale Free Network
Albert-László Barabási found that the degree distribution of the WWW network has a
certain rule: as the degree increases, the probability of node degree is lower. In this regard,
Barabási established the scale free model (Barabási, 2002), in which the degree of the
network conforms to the power rate distribution. Epidemiology uses this theory to develop
different immunization strategies. (Reuven Cohen, 2003) The scale free network actually
provides a dynamic and complex network analysis method. Generally, the evolution of the
network includes adding nodes, adding edges, reconnecting, reducing nodes, and reducing
edges. Therefore, after considering the effect of time changes on the network structure,
Krapivsky proposed a model to observe the changes of the network using the power
exponent changes in the network. (P.L. Krapivsky, 2000)Albert and Barabási's second
Scale Free network mechanism model (2000) considers three events: adding points, adding
edges, and reconnecting. The research results show that both power rate distribution and
exponential distribution can appear in the network.
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Figure 2.8 Network sample for Scale Free Network.
Source: Reka Albert, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, 2002.

2.2.4 Application
Luo (2013) introduced the complex network model into the analysis of railway accidents.
The original work is that the author provides a method to convert the railway accident into
a network. As shown in the following figure, the levels include the organization (national
level and local level), technology, staff and equipment of China's High-Speed Rail. The
author analyzed the statistical characteristics of the network and found the key factors of
the accident.
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Figure 2.9 Coding method for causation network.
Source: Luo, 2013.
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Figure 2.10 Coding method and undirected network based on “7.23 Railroad Accident”.
Source: Luo, 2013.

Compared to Luo, it uses an undirected network model, Liu established directed
weighted accident causation network (DWACN) for the Rail Accident Investigation
Branch (RAIB) in the UK, (Figure 2.10) which is based on complex network and using
event chains of accidents. DWACN is composed of 109 nodes which denote causal factors
and 260 directed weighted edges which represent complex interrelationships among
factors. The statistical properties of directed weighted complex network are applied to
reveal the critical factors, the key event chains and the important classes in DWACN.
Analysis results demonstrate that DWACN has characteristics of small-world networks
with short average path length and high weighted clustering coefficient, and display the
properties of scale-free networks captured by that the cumulative degree distribution
follows an exponential function. This modeling and analysis method can assist us to
discover the latent rules of accidents and feature of faults propagation to reduce accidents.
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This research is a further development of accident analysis methods using complex
network.

Figure 2.11 Directed causation network for accidents analytics.
Source: Zhou, 2015.
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2.3 High-Speed Rail Study
2.3.1 General Study
Up to now, the research on High-Speed Rail has mainly focused on the economic field,
such as the return on investment problem, competition with other travel modes, and the
impact of High-Speed Rail on the regional economy.
Return of investment (ROI)
Return on investment is a concern of almost all countries and institutions, which is
the key to the success of infrastructure. An important reason why most countries, including
the United States, have not replaced traditional railways with High-Speed Rail is the high
investment. According to the World Bank ’s research, the construction cost of High-Speed
Rail per kilometer is as high as 145 million euros, even in China, which has the lowest cost,
also reached 15.4-20.6 million US dollars per kilometer. (Osakar Herics, 2018) Risk
analysis is necessary. For example, Thibaut LIMON, Yves CROZET, after evaluating
different discount rates and risk factors in the evaluation of the South West High-Speed
Rail project in France, the NPV value of the project changed from 735 million euros to 1.298 billion euros. This means that the economic value of the project needs to be reviewed.
The research of Liu and Lv provides the ROI data of China ’s first High-Speed Rail,
according to the research. Liu and Lv studies the investment-return of Beijing-Tianjin
High-Speed Rail, and adopts a systematic analysis approach, which made connections
between life cycle costs, revenues and ridership. After testing a number of life cycle
scenarios, the authors have developed ridership potential and associated fare policies. The
analysis results show that investments in High-Speed Rail will receive adequate returns
when the investment recovery period and life expectancy of High-Speed Rail are linked
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and fare structures correspond to the demographic and social economic status of the
travelers along the corridors.
Both Christian and Liu's research provide examples of the country's support for the
development of High-Speed Rail. In Italy, the government provides support through
massive public funding and special regulations, while in China, government-led
technology transfer and the state-owned economy dominate the development of HighSpeed Rail. This proves that safe and adequate financial support is the key to the success
of the High-Speed Rail project.
Economic Impact
The economic impact of High-Speed Rail is mainly reflected in the tourism and
aviation industries. Thanks to the European Structure and Investment Fund (ESIF), Spain
has the world's second-highest railway construction plan after China. Even after
experiencing its worst High-Speed Rail accident in 2014, Spain still plans to expand its
High-Speed Rail network to 10,000 kilometers by 2020. It is the economic growth and the
movement of people brought by High-Speed Rail driving the construction of Spain's HighSpeed Rail network. Spain ’s tourism industry accounts for 16% of GDP. The impact of
High-Speed Rail on tourism has attracted the attention of many scholars. B. Guirao take
Spanish case study try to figure out the High-Speed Rail impact for tourism, author analysis
13 province via econometric model. For domestic travelers, the only provinces where there
seems to be a relation between High-Speed Rail and the number of tourists is Guadalajara
and Cuenca. The reason of few article is that there is only one data resource which from
hotel, that maybe misleading the research finding: the main advantage for traveler take
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High-Speed Rail is able to save money at overnight, that means part of travelers’ number
may be missed.
Francesca Pagliara developed a Revealed Preference survey at four famous tourist
places at Madrid. Based on the survey data collected, authors calibrate two models via
logistic regression approach to find out the relation between High-Speed Rail and tourists’
destination choices. Depends on some characteristics of the Madrid tourism market and
Spanish High-Speed Rail lacking contact with EURO railway network, the influence of
High-Speed Rail is especially reflected in international tourists.

Table 2.2 High-Speed Rail Impact on Tourist Choice

Source: Francesca, 2017.
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Table 2.2 shows the international tourists value aspects such as comfort and travel
time reductions, and are generally less sensitive to ticket prices. The research has made it
clear that other signiﬁcant motivation for choosing High-Speed Rail is the possibility to
visit nearby cities accessible by high-quality means of transport.
High-Speed Rail also have an impact on the aviation industry. This impact is
confined to the region, cross-border and long-distance routes are less affected. The impact
of the aviation industry also includes lower fares and fewer flight frequencies. The
advantage is that the High-Speed Rail can also help the airline's network to cover more
fringe markets. Wenyi Xia and Anming Zhang conducted a deeper study of the connecting
market and found that the cooperation between High-Speed Rail and airlines increased the
connecting market fare. Angela Stefania Bergantino, Leonardo Madio studied the impact
of socio-economic factors on travelers ’choices between High-Speed Rail and aviation
based on data from Italy, and found that High-Speed Rail customers increase with age,
income, and education. And passengers for business travel are more inclined to take the
High-Speed Rail.
2.3.2 High-Speed Rail Safety
In the railway safety research ﬁeld, plenty of works have been published which can be
divided into two aspects: causation modeling, and accident prediction. For example, Dong
and Wan (2013) propose an accident causation model to examine the presence of
signiﬁcant correlations, and they ﬁnd interesting relationships among accident causal
factors. Baysari et al. (2008) adopt the Human Factors Analysis and Classiﬁcation System
(HFACS) framework to identify errors associated with rail accidents/ incidents in Australia.
Ouyang et al. (2010) employ the Systems-Theoretical Accident Model and Processes
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(STAMP) analysis technique to model the China–Jiaoji railway accident, and to discuss
the accident spreading processes. Particularly, studies are carried out to evaluate the human
factor in emergency situations during the Ladbroke Grove railroad accident (Stanton and
Baber, 2008; Stanton and Walker, 2011). These studies also discuss how a driver passing
a signal at danger would cause the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster. Here the root causal factor
is the driver passing a signal, which is considered as a human factor. Oh et al. (2006) use
various statistical models to examine the relationships between crossing accidents and
features of crossings. Depending on the data of American Railway Safety Annual Report
in 2005, Wang et al. (2009) build a railway accident prediction model with gray theory to
predict the accident occurrence.
TRID is the largest database that combines the records from TRB's Transportation
Research Information Services (TRIS) Database and the OECD's Joint Transport Research
Centre's International Transport Research Documentation (ITRD) Database. Currently,
TRID is able to provide research scholars in the field of transportation with more than 1.25
worldwide Millions of documents. However, only a very small amount of literature on
High-Speed Rail safety research is currently available in the TRID database. The very
limited literature focuses on the areas of mechanical design, Power System and traditional
railway safety analysis: grade crossing.
Mechanical Safety
René Heyder, Gregor Girsch, studied different rail materials for rolling contact. The
resistance of fatigue (RCF) has verified that head hardened rails have a better resistance
against RCF defects than rails with as-rolled hardness. High-speed trains have extremely
high requirements for the ballast of the railway track. The traditional ballast will cause the
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ballast to be dislocated when passing through the high-speed train, affecting safety. Jieyi
Deng developed the Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) model for evaluating the risk of
flying ballast on High-Speed Rail. China, Japan and Germany have developed ballast less
tracks for High-Speed Rail construction, providing better safety. Another focus is the
impact of the environment on High-Speed Rail. Ma studied the fatigue crack growth and
damage characteristics of High-Speed Rail rails under low temperature conditions. Xin
Zhao's cracks on the rails are also low temperature. The damage to the rails deepens as the
temperature decreases, and the form changes. Chongyi Chang et al. studied the wheel-rail
adhesion of High-Speed Rail, and studied the changes of wheel-rail adhesion under
different speed and temperature conditions, which is conducive to the design and
improvement of train anti-skid control device. Ignacio Villalba Sanchis predicts that the
probability of the occurrence of buckling events on the rails of the Spanish High-Speed
Rail network will increase greatly in the context of global climate change. Liu conducted
a similar study on wheel-rail contact and found that water has a positive effect on increasing
the friction between the train wheel and the track.
Power System Safety
The most vulnerable part of the High-Speed Rail is the catenary system, which is
easily damaged due to long-term exposure to air and the formation of complex electronic
components. Xiao Wu developed an image recognition tool to detect the bird nest on the
catenary system to eliminate the threat to train operation. He summarized the safety risk
assessment research of the entire power supply system including catenary system. The
article introduces the risk sources of the power supply system, including equipment
performance degradation, environmental risks, and improper maintenance and repairs.
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Grade Crossing Safety
The main areas that Federal Railroad Administration declared to enhance railway
safety include:
1. Positive Train Control (PTC) Implementation
2. Rail Grade Crossing and Trespassing Prevention outreach
3. Human Factor / Workers Protection
4. Administering funding for rail infrastructure upgrades across the nation
5. Tank Cat Enhancements
The traditional railway safety theme, "grade crossing safety" is still the theme of
American railway safety during the period of developing High-Speed Rail. Samantha G.
introduced the safety challenges encountered by grade crossing on High-Speed Rail lines.
The study mainly summarizes the current technical means, management methods and
safety education that need to adapt to the changes brought about by the High-Speed Rail.
For example, signal lights and reminders will not adapt to the speed of high-speed trains
and cause potential safety hazards.
Accident Analysis
Research on High-Speed Rail accidents is even more limited. The only article is
found in the analysis of the cause of a single accident. Ziyan Luo analyzed the cause of the
7.23 do EMU accident by establishing a causation network. In research, Luo regard the
accident occurrence as a cascading failure and reveal key causation factors and key
causation chains.
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2.4 Summary
It can be concluded by reviewing the history of accident analysis theory that statistics is
the most basic accident research method, and almost all accident analysis methods or
models are based on statistics. The reason behind this fact is the importance of data in all
analysis. Unfortunately, due to the lack of data, the current research on High-Speed Rail
focuses on economic analysis and comparative analysis of various travel modes, and the
research on safety topics is obviously insufficient. The only High-Speed Rail safety study
is an analysis of isolated cases, and the results are not representative.
Most of the mature analysis tools in security research belong to qualitative analysis.
By abstracting the system and logically inferring it, finding key nodes of the system and
exploring ways to maintain security / normal operation. Quantitative analysis tools are
inadequate. Complex network models are still statistical analysis in nature, but by adding
directionality and weight to the network, it reflects the logical relationship of accidents.
In summary, the accident analysis of High-Speed Rail lacks macro analysis and
research, and lacks a general description of the safety status of High-Speed Rail operations.
The research on the difference between High-Speed Rail and regular railway accidents is
still blank.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY

The research method of this paper is to use the network theory in graph theory to simulate
the accident cause network in railway accidents. Network theory has applications in many
disciplines, and a large number of network structures also exist in the field of
transportation. Even the first widely recognized proof of the "Seven Bridges Problem" in
network theory can be regarded as a traffic problem. The transportation lines we are
familiar with (roads, railways, subways and air lines) have formed a complex transportation
network, which is also the most common form of network. Traffic in the network provides
network direction and weighting characteristics. For example, in a traffic network, the
traffic volume of different traffic lines will affect the importance of the line in the network,
and the difference in traffic flow in different driving directions also determines the
characteristics of different networks or lines. The various characteristics of the network
precisely reflect the complexity of the real world. The benefits provided by abstract
networks are not only concise but also computable. The mathematical characteristics of the
network, such as clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, etc., provide an effective
tool for analyzing the characteristics of the network in reality.

3.1 Overview
The structure of the methodology shown in Figure 3.1, identify the code of the cause, and
then determine the direction between the factors through the sequence of events in the
accident. Through weighting, the second weighting takes into account the importance of
41

the event and the severity of the accident into the network to complete the network
modeling. Calculate the mathematical characteristics of DWDN, including degree,
strength, path length, etc.
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Figure 3.1 Methodology overview.
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3.2 Complex Network Concepts
A complex network is a network structure composed of a huge number of nodes and edges
connecting nodes. The mathematical definition of a complex network is a graph with a
complex topology. Its structure is not completely regular or completely random. Figure 3.2
shows a typical complex network. The picture shows the aviation network in North
America. The countless routes (edges) in the figure are connected to countless airports
(nodes). The complexity of the network cannot be described in simple language. The
analysis of complex networks must also rely on mathematical tools.
A directed weighted network G with N nodes can be represented mathematically
by an N × N adjacency matrix A with elements.

Figure 3.2 A conventional airline network in North America.
Source: Hidefumi Sawai, 2012.
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3.2.1 Node
In network theory, nodes are one of the basic units of the network. The node and the edge
connecting the two nodes together form a network. Nodes can represent different concepts
in different networks. For example, nodes in a bus network can represent bus stations;
nodes in a computer network can represent computers or routers. In this article, the nodes
in the accident causation network represent the single events that occurred in the accident.
The mathematical features of node in the network are degree, weight, clustering
coefficient, betweenness centrality, etc.
3.2.2 Edge
One of the basic units of the network, expressing the connection between two vertices. In
an accident causation network, an edge indicates that there is a causal connection between
two vertices (events). According to the directed nature of graphs, edges can be divided into
two types: directed edges and undirected edges.
The mathematical features of edges in the network are weight, path length, etc.

3.3 Complex Network Features
3.3.1 Degree
One of the mathematical features of the node. The value of degree is equal to the number
of all points connected by this node. It reflects the connectivity of vertices. The larger the
value, the higher the connectivity. Note that the concept of degree does not consider the
number of connections (strength) between two nodes.
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As shown in Figure 3.3, the degrees of nodes A, B, C, and D are 2, 3, 1, and 4. That
is, 𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎 = 2, 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 = 3, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 1, 𝑘𝑘𝑑𝑑 = 4.

Figure 3.3 Undirected network sample.

In directed graphs, degrees are divided into in-degree and out-degree. In directed
network (Figure 3.4) with almost the same structure as the above figure, the values of indegree, out-degree and all-degree of node A, B, C, D are shown in Table 3.1
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Table 3.1 Degree Calculation Sample
Node

In-degree

Out-degree

All-degree

A

0

2

2

B

1

2

3

C

1

0

1

D

2

0

2

Figure 3.4 Directed network sample.

47

The equations for degree are as follows:

Degree: (Undirected Network)

k i = � 𝑎𝑎ij
j∈N

(3.1)

Where:
i: node i in the network
j: any node except node i in the network
N: the number of nodes in the network
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 : degree of node i

𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : equal to 1, when the node i is connected to the node j, otherwise is 0

In-Degree (Directed Network)

𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.2)

𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Where
0

𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : equal to 1, when the i node points to the j node and is connected, otherwise is
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Out-Degree (Directed Network)

𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(3.3)

𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Where
0

𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 : equal to 1, when the j node points to the i node and is connected, otherwise is

Total-Degree (Directed Network)
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖−𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

(3.4)

𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Degree distribution

∞

𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 ′

(3.5)

𝑘𝑘 ′ =𝑘𝑘

Where
P (k): refers to the sum of the probabilities that the degree is greater than or equal
to k.
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3.3.2 Strength
One of the mathematical characteristics of a node, the value of strength is equal to the
number of all edges connected by this node. Strength can evaluate the importance of nodes
in the network. The larger the value, the higher the importance. Note that the difference
between strength and degree is that if you calculate two nodes connected multiple times.
Degree ignores duplicate connections, and strength counts them. Also taking Figure 3.3 as
an example, the strengths of nodes A, B, C, and D are exactly the same, because the
connection state of the points is completely the same.
Same as degree, strength is also divided into in-strength and out-strength in the
directed network. Similarly, because the network structure only adds directions, the instrength, out-strength, and all-strength of the four nodes are exactly the same as the indegree, out-degree, and all-degree values of node ABCD.
The strength equations are as follows:

Strength: (Undirected Network)

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Where:
i: node i in the network
j: any node except node i in the network
N: is the number of nodes in the network
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(3.6)

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 : strength of node i

𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : the weight of edge ij, which value equal to the number of connections from
node i to node j

In-Strength (Directed Network)

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.7)

𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Where
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : equal to the number of connections from node i to node j
Out-Strength (Directed Network)

𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Where
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : equal to the number of connections from node j to node i
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(3.8)

Total-Strength (Directed Network)
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + � 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

(3.8)

𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁

Strength distribution

∞

𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = � 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠′

(3.9)

𝑠𝑠 ′ =𝑠𝑠

Where
P (s): refers to the sum of the probabilities that the strength is greater than or equal
to s.
3.3.3 Comparison of Degree and Strength
The calculation formula of degree and strength is similar, but the mathematical meaning is
quite different. The difference can be clearly distinguished from Figure 3.5. Compared with
Figure 3.4, a directional connection is added between the two nodes B and D, which can
be regarded as a simple weighting of Figure 3.4. Table 3.2 shows the value of degree and
strength after directional and weighted. The values in brackets come from the unweighted
network (Figure 3.4)
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Table 3.2 Degree and Strength Comparison (sample)
Direction-in

Direction-out

All

Node
degree

strength

degree

strength

degree

strength

A

0 (0)

0 (0)

2 (2)

2 (2)

2 (2)

2 (2)

B

1 (1)

1 (1)

2 (2)

3 (2)

3 (3)

4 (3)

C

1 (1)

1 (1)

0 (0)

0 (0)

1 (1)

1 (1)

D

2 (2)

3 (2)

0 (0)

0 (0)

2 (2)

3 (2)

The difference is reflected in nodes B and D. (Table 3.2) It can be seen that the
increased connection has no effect on the degree value, but obviously the network is
strengthened between these two nodes, and the degree value remains unchanged and the
connectivity of the entire network has not changed. Such a comparison helps to understand
the difference between degree and strength.
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Figure 3.5 Directed network sample with weighted.

3.3.4 Dual Weighted
Double weighting means that while considering the strength of the network edge, the
impact of the severity of the accident on the network structure is also considered. As
mentioned above, railway traffic accidents are divided into four levels according to the
time of casualties, property damage and traffic interruption. In the previous analysis
methods and models, all attempts to use quantitative analysis methods for accidents are
based on a unified standard to quantify the cause of the accident. model the accident, and
then calculate the probability of the accident or the possible risk factors, the probability of
causing an accident. For example, the causation network and complex network mentioned
earlier. All causal factors are assigned a value of 1 (actually all factors in the model are
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assigned a value of 1). These methods are conducive to simplify modeling and calculation,
but the degree of danger that ignores the cause of the accident varies with the severity of
the consequences of the accident. For example, in the complex network model, both EM24
Signal Equipment failure and EM41 Train door detaching were assigned the same value
“1”. However, EM24 caused the 7.23 accident and killed dozens of people, while EM41
only caused a minor accident without any casualties. This is actually that the model is too
simplified in the modeling process, ignores the severity of the accident, and will mislead
the system to improve safety. Perhaps for isolated accidents, the difference in the influence
of factors is not as obvious as in this example. But when the sample size of the accident
case is large enough, the cumulative difference will be sufficient to affect the safety
improvement work.
Based on accident severity as shown in Table 3.3, the second weight details as
follows:
Table 3.3 Weight Value for Accident Level
Accident
Level

Second Weight
Factors (d)

Level Ⅰ

2.0

Level Ⅱ

1.8

Level Ⅲ

1.6

Level Ⅳ - A

1.4

Level Ⅳ - B

1.3

Level Ⅳ - C

1.1

Level Ⅳ - D

1.0
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Weighting instructions
First, the factor d of the lowest-level general accident is determined, that is, the type D
accident in level 4 is 1.0, and the upper limit of level 1 accident is 2.0.
Secondly, due to C in general accidents (level 4) accidents, D accidents do not
involve casualties and small property losses. Type C accidents are only slightly more
severe than Type D accidents, so the factor d for Type C accidents is set to 1.1.
Third, because the A and B accidents in the general accident (level 4) accidents
involved casualties and more serious property losses, there was a clear difference from the
C / D accidents, so there was a larger gap in weight, Set the factor d of the category B
accident to 1.3. Accident A and accident B are both general accidents, and are higher than
category B in various losses and injuries. Therefore, the factor d of the category A accident
is set to 1.4.
Finally, according to level 1, level 2 and level 3, the difference in loss is very
obvious, so the factor d of level 2 and level 3 accidents is set to 1.8 and 1.6 respectively.
3.3.5 (Shortest) Path Length
The path between two points is also called graph geodesic. In an undirected graph, the
distance between two points is the length of the shortest path between the two points. If
there is no path between two points, that is, they are not connected, then their distance is
defined as infinity. There is a possibility that there are multiple shortest paths between two
points.
In undirected graphs, the shortest path between two points is also directional, and
the length of the shortest path in the two directions may not be equal. Note that there is a
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case where the shortest path from node A to node B exists, and the shortest path from node
B to A does not exist.
The unweighted network defaults to a distance between two points of 1. Between
two points in a weighted graph, that is, edges, can have their own lengths. The length of
the edge is generally the weighted value of the edge.
The equation is as follows:

Shortest path length:

𝐿𝐿 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ℎ +∙∙∙ +𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑗𝑗 �

(3.10)

Where
L: the shortest path length
i, h, j: three different nodes in the network
3.3.6 Diameter / Radius / Average Path Length
The diameter of a network is defined as the largest value among the shortest path lengths
present in the network.
The radius is defined as the smallest value of the shortest path length existing in
the network.
The average path length is the average of the shortest path present in the network
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The equation is as follows:

Average shortest path length:
The weights need to be reversed first, so the calculation include two steps.

Step 1

𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 �

1
1
+∙∙∙ +
�
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖ℎ
𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑗𝑗

(3.12)

Step 2

𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 =

1
𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1)

�

𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖≠𝑗𝑗

𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(3.13)

Where
i, h, j: are three different nodes in the network
𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 : average shortest path length
3.3.7 Betweenness Centrality
The concept of betweenness centrality is a measure of network centrality based on
(shortest) path length. It is obtained by calculating the ratio of the number of paths passing
through the node in all the shortest paths to the total number of all shortest paths in the
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network. Betweenness centrality represents the degree of interaction between a node and
other nodes, and also measures the importance of the node. The node with high
betweenness centrality value is similar to a bridge on the river, and all cross-river traffic
must pass through the bridge. The bridge acts like a central node in the city's transportation
network. The importance of the bridge is expressed by the high value of betweenness
centrality.
The equation is as follows:

betweenness centrality

𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵 = �

𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,ℎ∈𝑁𝑁

𝑛𝑛ℎ
𝑛𝑛′

(3.14)

Where
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵 : the betweenness centrality of node h

i, h, j: three different nodes in the network
𝑛𝑛ℎ : the number shortest path with node h

𝑛𝑛′ : the total number of shortest path in the network N
3.3.8 Clustering Coefficient
In the network, if nodes A and B are connected and A and C are connected, then B and C
are also likely to be connected, that is, your different friends may also be friends. The
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clustering coefficient is used to describe the degree of clustering between nodes in a
network. The aggregation coefficient can measure a network or a node in the network.
The equation is as follows:

Node clustering coefficient:

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤 =

(𝑤𝑤′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤′𝑖𝑖ℎ )
1
�
𝑎𝑎′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎′𝑖𝑖ℎ 𝑎𝑎′𝑗𝑗ℎ
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − 1)
2

(3.15)

𝑗𝑗,ℎ

Where
𝑎𝑎′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =1 if 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 1

𝑤𝑤′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 : degree of node i
Average clustering coefficient:

����
𝐶𝐶 𝑤𝑤 =

1
� 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
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(3.16)

CHAPTER 4
DATA COLLECTION

4.1 Case Selection
Case studies require that the research object has sufficient data, and it can represent the
field of research, have rich connotations, and more importantly, have value and ability for
future development.
4.1.1 Country Selection
Since the successful operation of the first commercial railway in Leeds, England, the
railway has been developed in human society for more than two hundred years. Almost all
countries in the world have this mode of transportation. It has been sixty years since the
Japanese started construction of the High-Speed Rail. Over 20 countries in the world have
operated High-Speed Rail with a total mileage of more than 50,000 kilometers. At the same
time, there are only a handful of countries that have developed outstandingly in these two
fields. Japan is one of the most developed countries in railway transportation and the
birthplace of High-Speed Rail. However, Japan's railway operation system is too
complicated. In addition to the seven large railway companies evolved from the "National
Railways" JR Group, there are 16 medium-sized railway companies operating in the
metropolitan area and many small railway companies. This fragmented business model has
hindered research. France is an outstanding representative of the European High-Speed
Rail, with the highest passenger volume and top High-Speed Rail manufacturers like
Alstom. However, the French high-speed trains use a hybrid mode, and high-speed trains
can run on both regular railway networks and High-Speed Rail. This hybrid networking
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model makes it difficult to distinguish High-Speed Rail from traditional railways. The most
direct impact is that the liability and loss of railway accidents are difficult to determine.
The United States has the largest railway network in the world, but the passenger train
business is shrinking year by year. And there is actually no real high-speed train running
in the United States. The only Acela express train that meets the US DOT High-Speed Rail
standard has an average operating speed of only 110 kilometers per hour. Britain is the
hometown of railways, and has a sound railway management system and a professional
accident analysis organization IRAB. However, the High-Speed Rail has only a 100-km
line, and the data volume is too limited to support research.
Comprehensive comparison of major countries can be found China is the most
suitable case study of railway (High-Speed Rail) safety. China has the world's largest
railway passenger transportation network, and the number of passengers on China's railway
network is high every year. During the “Spring Festival” period of railway transportation,
the number of passengers traveling by train was as high as 100 billion people, with an
average of 500 million people every day. There are 3,000 EMUs driving on the rails every
day. There are more than 5,000 trains. Far more than Japan, Europe, let alone the gradually
shrinking North American railway network.
China has the world's largest High-Speed Rail network. As mentioned earlier.
China has built a 38,000-kilometer High-Speed Rail in just ten years, connecting all major
metropolitan areas in China. The High-Speed Rail presents a multi-layer and multi-style
network structure in China:
The first, the north-south arterial route that runs through the country, such as the
Beijing-Hong Kong High-Speed Rail, has a total length of 2260 kilometers and a speed of
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350 kilometers per hour, connecting Beijing and Hong Kong. This is also the world ’s
longest High-Speed Rail.
The second, the High-Speed Rail along the river: a total length of 1900 kilometers
and a speed of 350 kilometers per hour. A High-Speed Rail connecting the Yangtze River,
the third longest river in the world, and all cities along the coast. Expanded Shanghai, the
world's largest port is also China's economic center, economic hinterland to the Sichuan
Basin.
The third, in the Pearl River Delta region, the express passenger transport channel
between cities has formed a High-Speed Rail network centered on Guangzhou and
radiating to surrounding small cities, forming an inter-city express passenger transport
network in the urban area. In a sense, it played the role of commuter railway.
At last, the reconstructed fast railway. That is, after the original line is transformed,
the operating speed reaches 200km / h or more. Although it is no longer classified as a
High-Speed Rail according to China's latest official definition, it still meets the speed
requirements of most countries in the world for High-Speed Rail. At present, this part of
the railway has not yet achieved the separation of passengers and goods.
In summary, the huge number of passengers, the rich types of routes, plus the
diverse geographical characteristics of China. This allows China's High-Speed Rail
network to meet any analysis needs.
Of course, China is not a perfect case for research. The difficulty lies not in the lack
of data but how to obtain it. There is a complete accident handling and information
collection system in China, which is called the Ministry of Emergency Management of the
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People ’s Republic of China (State Administration of Work Safety before 2018) at the
national level. After the accident, the emergency management department reports it to
local institutions at various levels. This is the only data most people see publicly. The
annual report is published around April of each year, and the specific disclosure time may
be advanced or delayed by about a month in different years. The information contained in
the annual report is very limited. The data related to accidents are only the number of
deaths, the number of particularly serious accidents and an indicator that links the traffic
volume with the number of deaths: a death rate of 1 billion tons kilometers. Only a vague
shadow can be obtained through the report, so the quantity and quality of the data are the
only factors that restrict the research.
4.1.2 Operation and Accident Management in China
There are three levels in the current railway management systems: China Railway
Corporation as the top level, the regional railway company as the middle tier and the
segment or section as the third, or operating units of actual railway lines and stations. There
are 18 railway companies, each with route segment and a local joint venture railway
company. As independent legal entities, the regional railway companies operate all the
railway services in its territories and their financial information are tallied independently.
There are sub-bureaus in major cities, which are responsible for the daily supervision and
management of railway operations and report to the regional railway companies.
Similar to the definitions used in the US, railway accident is defined as collision,
derailment, fire, explosion, act of God, or other event involving the operation of on-track
equipment, standing or moving, that results in total damages that are above certain
threshold.
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As documented in Table 4.1, railway accidents in China are generally placed in one
of the four categories according to “Rules for Railway Traffic Accident Investigation and
Handling”. The rail specific rules were developed by the Ministry of Railways in
accordance with the “Regulations on Emergency Rescue and Investigation of Railway
Traffic Accidents” formulated by the State Council of China. The placements are largely
based on five different parameters: fatality, injury, property damage, derailment and delays.
It is noted that the number of carts derailed for passenger and freight is different, which is
logic as freight trains are generally longer and damages are assessed very different when
human lives are involved, such as the case in passenger trains. Similarly, the operation
stoppage or delay is generally measured by the number of hours the railroad is out of
service and the delays along mainline operations are rated much higher than that of minor
or branch lines.
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Table 4.1 Railway Accident Classifications in China
Property
Fatalities

Injuries

Damage

(person)

(person)

(Million

Level

Derailment

Operation

（Passenger/

stoppage

Freight）

(hours)

RMB)
>18 (P) or
I

>30

>100

>￥100

>48
>60 (F)

II

10-29

III

3-9

IV

<3

50-99

10-49

<10

2-17 (P) or

>24 (mainline) or

6-59 (F）

>48 (Minor)

2-17 （P）

>6 (Main) or

6-59（F）

>10 (Minor)

￥50 -100

￥10 -50

<￥10

Other specific conditions

Source: State Council of China, 2008.

There are four sub-categories: A, B, C and D, under the Level IV classification,
which correspond to conditions that are more specific. For example, 4A specifies that two
or less fatalities occurred, there are 5-10 serious injuries, property damage is between 5-10
million RMB, or the number of derailed carts and stoppage periods can vary depending on
the type of trains and types of routes. In general, the type 4A is more severe than that of
4B, 4C, and 4D. The least severe category, 4D, may involve shunting conflict, wrong or
not timely signal to cause the train to stop, mail loading and unloading operations delay the
train, etc.

66

4.1.3 Study area Selection
Guangzhou Railway Group manages the longest High-Speed Rail line among the 18
regional companies. The region also has China ’s largest island, Hainan Island. Two of the
four first-tier cities: Shenzhen and Guangzhou. Hong Kong, one of the world's financial
centers, is also connected to China's railway network through Guangzhou Railway Group.
The rich geographical characteristics and the multi-level economic development of the
region have made Guangzhou Railway Group possess all the characteristics of China's
High-Speed Rail. The following are the specific characteristics of this area:
Guangzhou Railway Group is located in the south-central part of China, and it has
jurisdiction over some railways in Guangdong, Hunan and Hainan. It is located in BeijingGuangzhou line, Jiaoliu line, Shanghai-Kunming line, Yuhuai line, Hengliu line, Xianggui
line, Guangmao line and Beijing. The 9th line and the Guangzhou-Shenzhen, Shichang,
Guangmei and other lines and the Guangdong, Hainan West Ring Line and Pingnan have
a total of 4907.6 kilometers to operate the general-speed railway. The High-Speed Rail
includes the Beijing-Guangzhou High-Speed Rail, the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong
High-Speed Rail and the Xiamen-Shenzhen railway. Shanghai-Kunming Passenger
Dedicated Line, Guiguang Passenger Dedicated Line, and Nanguang Railway.
The total length of the line is 10483.7 kilometers, the operating mileage is 4907.6
kilometers, the electrified operating mileage is 2005.554 kilometers, and the contact
network is 72146.693 kilometers. There are 11785 group of Taoyuan, 2754 bridges,
301,637 meters, 964 tunnels, 435,043 meters, culverts, 19916, 527,074 meters. There are
1,291 locomotives, including 726 diesel locomotives and 565 electric locomotives; 4,322
passenger cars, with 11,12 vehicles in line. There are 456 jurisdiction stations, including 6
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special stations, 15 first-class stations, 23 second-class stations, and 40 third-class stations.
There are 6 marshalling stations. There are 477 interlocking stations, of which 294 are relay
interlocking stations. The automatic blocking line is 2033 kilometers, and the semiautomatic blocking line is 3372.7 kilometers.
The study area of this article involves three provinces in China, including Hunan
Province, Guangdong Province and Hainan Province from north to south. The hills in all
three provinces accounted for a relatively high proportion, of which Hunan hills accounted
for 70.2% of the total area of the province, and water areas accounted for 5.3%;
Guangdong's hilly and mountainous terrain accounted for about 62% of the province's area,
and the rest were plain. The main land part of Hainan Province is Hainan Island. The island
takes mountainous terrain as the main terrain, and a high-speed ring railway is built around
the island's central mountain range.

4.2 Data Collection
The data used in this research comes from the compilation of accidents prepared by
Guangzhou Railway Group. This book has not been published and is only for internal use.
The information includes 68 railway accidents with a time span of 2013-2017. According
to the accident responsibility department, all accidents are divided into six chapters:
Operation Department, Drive Department, Energy and Signal Department, Rolling Stock
Department, Tracks and Structures Department and Subcontractors Department. Each
accident includes the occurrence of the accident, time, location, route, repair or rescue
treatment method and accident lost. Each accident record also comes with the judgment of
the cause of the accident and the judgment of responsibility. The 68 accidents include 28
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High-Speed Rail accidents and 40 regular railway accidents. Since there is currently no
obvious distinction between High-Speed Rail and regular railways in management, the
judgment criteria for High-Speed Rail accidents are as follows:
1. The accident happened on a High-Speed Rail line.
2. The accident vehicle is a high-speed train or EMU vehicle.
3. If the accident occurs at a station, it must be a newly built High-Speed Rail
station on the High-Speed Rail line.
4. The accident involves damage to High-Speed Rail facilities, vehicles or
employees, or the cause of the accident is related to the construction,
maintenance and repair of High-Speed Rail.

4.3 Data Overview
4.3.1 National Level
According to limited data, the state of railway transportation safety in China can be
observed at the national level. The total number of railroad accidents are generally tallied
according to the classification presented above. As mentioned earlier, there is no separate
report for High-Speed Rail operations and even the railway accident numbers were
removed from the annual bulletin since 2013. The only available data are from 2011 and
2012. As shown in Figure 4. 1, there was only one “extremely serious” Level I accident in
the two years combined and it belongs to the accident took place along the Fuzhou –
Wenzhou Line on July 23, 2011.
The infamous “7.23” accident had claimed 40 lives, including three train
crewmembers. The official statistics claimed that 172 people were injured and the railway
segment was out of service for 32 hours and 35 minutes. Comparing to the serious Level I
or II accidents, the total number of types 4D accidents/incident seem large at 1,997 and
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2,318 for 2011 and 2012 respective. However, when putting in the contest of 93,000 route
miles or 1.86 billion passengers transported annually, the incident rates per route mile or
per passenger mile travelled (PMT) is much lower than that of US.
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Figure 4.1 Railway accidents in China, 2011 and 2012.
Sources: Railway Statistical Bulletin, 2011, 2012.

On the other hand, one accident is too many. In 2011, the Chinese railway
department interrupted the operation for a total of 119 hours and 6 minutes due to accidents,
and the economic loss was 247,031,300 (RMB). In 2012, the railway operation was
interrupted for 100 hours and 27 minutes, and the economic loss was 62.926 million
(RMB). With the extension of the High-Speed Rail, the High-Speed Rail will soon cover
all the large cities in China, and the railroad tracks will soon cross the border. More cities
mean more complex networks, and the disruption of any node or line will have a huge
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impact on the network. Research and prevention of accidents will definitely be an
important aspect of High-Speed Rail operations.
4.3.2 Accident Trending
According to accident statistics (Figure 4.2), the number of accidents of Guangzhou
Railway Group has been stable since 2013-2014, and reached the most in 2015, but in 2016
The number of accidents has dropped significantly. It shows that the security situation has
improved in 2016.
By observing the accident data and the operating line length together, we can find
that the operating line length has increased significantly in 2015, and the number of
accidents in the same period has increased correspondingly. It can be inferred that a large
number of new lines were put into operation in a short period of time, which had an
important impact on the daily operations of the enterprise. According to the STAMP model,
the ability to control the safety constraints of the railway system is weakened. The
constraints here can be management capabilities; the number of operating or maintaining
employees, the level of training and experience; the reliability of the equipment, etc.
During the period of 2016-2017, the length of operating lines changed relatively smoothly,
and the number of accidents decreased significantly each year. This can prove the previous
conclusion from the opposite direction: the system's constraint on safety is recovering,
maybe the staff of different departments have gained enough experience, and maybe the
reliability of the equipment is improving.
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Accident Trending
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Figure 4.2 Accidents trending (Guangzhou, 2013-2017).
Regarding the proportion analysis of accident types, the proportion of B, C, and D
accidents has been stable. Class C accidents accounted for the largest proportion between
2013 and 2017, and tripled in 2015 compared to the previous year. By querying the
classification criteria for railway traffic accidents in the "Rules for Investigation and
Handling of Railway Traffic Accidents", C and D-level accidents belong to the general
category without causing casualties or obvious property losses (the judgment criterion is
whether the property loss exceeds RMB 1 million) accident. C-level accidents are more
serious and pose greater threats to operational safety. Although Class B accidents account
for the smallest proportion, Class B accidents have higher hazards, or there are casualties,
or property loss exceeds RMB 1 million, or the railway line is interrupted. Class B
accidents also tripled in 2015 from the previous year, and together with Class C accidents
marked a deterioration in railway safety in 2015.
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4.3.3 Accident Location
Figure 4.3 shows the location of accident during 2013-2017. The first factor that affects
the location of the accident should be geography. Due to the development of China's civil
engineering and construction technology, the construction of High-Speed Rail has crossed
the obstacles of the terrain. You can find that there are High-Speed Rail tracks on any
terrain in China. Therefore, the location of the railway accident did not reflect very obvious
geographical features, and only a few accidents that occurred in tunnels and bridges could
be found.
During the study period, more than 90% (or even 100% in 2013 and 2013) of
accidents occurred within the scope of open lines and stations, of course, this is also the
main body of the railway. In most years (2013 and 2015-2017), the proportion of accidents
that occurred at the station range was higher than on the line. The reason is that the station
environment is more complicated. The station not only has the same track, signal, power,
communication and other equipment as the line, but also more supplies, station
maintenance, passenger and freight facilities and more types of workers. All of the abovementioned complex conditions converge at the variability of the different parts of the
station, organization, individual, equipment, etc., and cause resonance, causing the station
to be less secure than the line.
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Accident Location
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Figure 4.3 Accidents location (Guangzhou, 2013-2017).

4.3.4 Accident Department
Internal departments
The "accident department" appeared in the accident investigation report through
investigation and study of the accident, and believed that the accident was caused by the
mistake of this department. The division of departments is directly related to the Chinese
railway management system. In the Chinese railway management system, the operating
department is divided into five departments according to the work content:
1. Operating depot: In charge of train operation control and command, operation
monitoring and management of passenger, freight and other services to
ensure operating income.
2. Drive crew depot: In charge of the operation, maintenance and repair of
railway locomotives.
3. Energy and signal depot: The supervisor manages and maintains railway line
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signals, locomotive signals, and communication systems. It is also
responsible for the power supply of railway lines and vehicles.
4. Rolling stock depot: Responsible for the operation, maintenance and repair
of train vehicles (excluding locomotive). The depot is also the place where
vehicles are operated, managed, parked, repaired, and maintained in the urban
rail transit system (subway, urban light rail).
5. Tracks and structures: In charge of maintenance and repair of railway lines,
bridges, tunnels and some equipment.
6. Subcontractors: an additional category. Subcontractors are responsible for
railway engineering construction projects through outsourcing contracts.
Because the work area is highly coincident with the railway operation area,
the behavior of the subcontractor has a direct impact on railway safety.

Tracks and Structures Department
As shown in Figure 4.4, the highest percentage of accidents occurred in the rail and
structural sectors since 2014, which proves that this is the most dangerous sector in the
railway system. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, this department is responsible for
the maintenance and repair of all infrastructure of the railway system. As the department's
large working area has thousands of kilometers of railway tracks and bridges that need to
be inspected daily to ensure traffic safety. The department has the most employees and the
highest work intensity, which requires management, training and cooperation between
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departments to be skilled and effective. Mistakes in any detail are weakened security
constraints and may lead to accidents.
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Figure 4.4 Accidents department (Guangzhou, 2013-2017).

Typical Year
Observing the distribution of the number of accidents in different years, it is found
that the proportion of departments in 2015 is very representative. As mentioned above, the
number of accidents in 2015 was the highest during the study period. Also, in 2015, the
accidents in the four departments Track and structures, Energy, driver and operation were
almost equal, and the sum accounted for 90% of the total accidents. This once again proves
that the negative impact of a large number of new railway lines on operational safety in the
short term is comprehensive, and each department has experienced challenges in the same
period.
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Drive Department
The proportion of drive depot accidents has been increasing from 2013 to 2015.
China Railway Administration has admitted that the number and quality of EMUs system
staff are very weak, and in 2017, it filled up 6,400 mechanics. Some figures show that at
the end of 2016, employees under the age of 30 accounted for 80% of the total number of
employees in the EMUs system. Age is directly related to experience. Young employees
’poor operational skills and emergency response capabilities are the biggest hidden dangers
to EMUs’ operational safety. The High-Speed Rail accident that occurred in the Lion
Ocean Tunnel in Guangdong Province in February 2018 was due to the inexperience and
improper handling of the on-board mechanics, which caused the line to be interrupted for
8 hours, 19 train trips were cancelled or delayed and the journey of thousands of passengers
Delayed or cancelled.
4.4 Data Quality
The essence of network analysis is statistical analysis with the help of some methods of
graph theory. Regardless of degree or strength, it is the statistics of a certain aspect of the
incident that develops into an accident. Therefore, the key to the success of network
analysis is data. The data problems identified in the study included data availability and
accuracy.
4.4.1 Accessibility
The access to accident data is limited. The 68 accident reports used in this study came from
the internal training materials of a regional railway company in China. Because it is a safety
training material, the basic information of the accident is retained, but the attachment
materials for investigation reports such as testimonies, test reports, and schematic diagrams
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are deleted. This is not the most ideal data. But in a short period of time, this will be the
best data available on China's railway safety research. Under the current Chinese
management system, out of fear of the negative impact of public accident data on social
stability and economic development has prevented the disclosure of accident reports in
China. This makes accident data almost impossible to access. An exception is the 7.23
accident in 2011, because the losses caused by the accident were extremely large (forty
people were killed and 172 injured), and the accident report was published in full.
The unavailability of accident information is also related to the accident
investigation system. China has a complete accident reporting and investigation system
and has been established in legal form. However, there are still some areas that need to be
rethought in the details of this system. The first is the accident investigation agency.
According to the “Regulations for Emergency Rescue, Investigation and Handling of
Railway Traffic Accidents” that began in 2013, accident investigations are presided over
by different agencies according to the accident level. The details are shown in the Table
4.2.
Table 4.2 Investigation Agency of Railroad Accident
Accident
Level

Investigation Agency

Level Ⅰ

State Council or an agency authorized by the State Council

Level Ⅱ

Railway Administration
Railway Operation Management Agency or

Level Ⅲ & Ⅳ State Council (if necessary)
Source: State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2007.
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The main problem is that the railway operating unit and the railway supervisory
unit are unified in China, namely the China National Railway Group (and its regional
branches). The investigation organization of the accident is taken by the accident
occurrence organization, which is a typical problem of integration of government
administration with enterprise in the state-owned economy. In fact, this has changed from
an independent accident investigation to an internal responsibility investigation. The "State
Administration of Work Safety" (similar to the inter-departmental version of NTSB, later
reorganized as the National Emergency Department) was almost excluded from the
accident investigation and was only used as a data collection department. This cast doubt
on the credibility and transparency of the accident investigation. In fact, after the 7.23
accident investigation report was published, there were voices questioning that the accident
report masked the true cause of the accident. Accident liability tends to be borne by a
commercial company that appears to have no contact with the government.
4.4.2 Accuracy
The content of the accident investigation report is also insufficient. As shown in the Table
4.3. China's railway accident report clearly lacks research on the cause and development
chain of the accident. The vast majority of the report, about 3/4, is used to analyze accident
responsibility and safety education of various departments in detail.
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Table 4.3 Contents Requirement for Investigation Report
Index

Content

1

Accident profile.

2

Casualties and direct economic losses caused by the accident.

3

The cause and nature of the accident.

4

Identification of accident liability and suggestions for handling the person
responsible for the accident.

5

Advice on accident prevention and rectification measures.

6

Certification materials related to the accident.

Source: State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2007.

The ideal investigation report comes from the British RAIB agency. The Railway
Accident Investigation Service (RAIB) is the agency responsible for independent
investigation of railway accidents in the UK and Channel Tunnel. Established in 2005. The
RAIB report focuses on analyzing the cause of the accident rather than who is responsible.
As shown in the Table 4.4, the accident report records the sequence of events in the accident
and analyzes in detail the causes of the accident including immediate cause, underlaying
cause and causal factors. In addition, a monthly summary and annual report of the railway
accident can be found on the RAIB website.
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Table 4.4 Content of RAIB Accident Report (sample)
Content
Preface 3
Summary 7
Introduction 8
Definitions 8
The incident 9
Summary of the incident 9
Context 9
Background information 15
The sequence of events 17
Analysis 26
Identification of the immediate cause 26
Identification of causal factors 26
Identification of underlying factors 34
Observations 38
Previous occurrences of a similar character 40
Summary of conclusions 42
Immediate cause 42
Causal factors 42
Underlying factors 42
Additional observations 43
Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report 44
Recommendations and learning points 46
Recommendations 46
Learning points 47
Appendices 48
Appendix A - Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms 48
Appendix B - Investigation details
Source: UK RAIB, 2019.
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The agencies involved in the investigation of train accidents in the United States
are FRA and NTSB. FRA is an agency of the United States Department of Transportation
that manages federal-wide railways. NTSB is an independent federal agency responsible
for investigating traffic accidents. Three documents will be generated after a railroad
accident in the United States. These are the accident brief issued by NTSB, the accident
preliminary report and the investigation report issued by FRA. The difference between
these three documents is that the preliminary report simply records the status of the
accident and the composition and work plan of the accident investigation team, with the
shortest length. The brief records in more detail the geographical information of the
accident, the information of the rails and vehicles, and the results of various inspections.
The obvious difference is that the brief finally guessed the cause of the accident. The length
is slightly longer. The investigation report is located on the FRA website, and the report is
more focused on record archiving, and the accidents are recorded in standardized forms.
The main difference in the investigation report is that a formal conclusion has been made
on the cause of the accident. Generally speaking, the survey report is the longest. The
accident brief and preliminary report can be obtained on the NTSB website soon after the
accident, and the full investigation report may be delayed on the FRA website for a few
months.
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CHAPTER 5
NETWORK ESTALISHMENT

This chapter introduces the steps and tools used in complete network construction. And a
case has been used to demonstrate the structural characteristics of the network.

5.1 Causal Factors Coding and Directed
By reading the accident report, use the IRAB factor code to encode the accident. Coding
manual used for coding, the author combined both accidents investigate methods from UK
and China. In United Kingdom, there is an agency named Rail Accident Investigation
Branch (RAIB) in charge of accident investigate. In these accident reports from RAIB,
various factors can directly or indirectly result in accidents. To apply these causal factors
for analysis, they are summarized and divided into 5 classes in a systemic way: ‘‘Human
(H)’’, ‘‘Equipment & Machine (EM)’’, ‘‘Environment (E)’’ ‘‘Management (M)’’, and
‘‘Accident type (A, B, C, D)’’. These five classes can contain almost all of the causal
factors which are generated by workers, managers, machinery, electrical equipment,
external environment, construction establishment, management, etc. I take almost all the
causal factors classification for study in my research, beside the category “accident type”.
The reason is accident type is overlap with some other factors in RAIB’s system and more
importation is there is a better choice.
As mentioned in previous chapter, China's railway administration has developed
detailed accident classification regulation which called “Regulations on Emergency
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Rescue and Investigation of Railway Traffic Accidents”. The regulations stipulate complex
and detailed accident classification rules. In addition to the classification of four different
levels of accidents according to the severity of the accident, the regulations also specify the
specific types of accidents under the fourth level (also named as general accidents). In the
regulations, the fourth-level accident is subdivided into four sub-categories, named A, B,
C, and D accident types. (Appendix B) Among them, the A/B type accidents are determined
according to the severity of the accident, such as the number of casualties, economic losses
and the interruption of railway operation time. The C/D type accident is classified into 46
accidents and has an accident code according to the form and cause of the accident.
In the study, the accident type code was included in the accident report from China,
and more than 98% of the accidents belonged to the C/D category in the fourth-level
accident, that is, the accident coded according to the accident pattern and cause. So, I only
used the event code from RAIB in the cause of the accident, and I used the code from the
Chinese railway administration when selecting the accident type code.
The following is an example of encoding:

Original accident record: (Originally in Chinese, translated)
“In the construction plan of the Guangzhou South High-Speed Rail Engineering
Section, there is no clear responsibility for the lead driver. The lead driver is temporarily
replaced before the start of construction. The leading driver did not perform his due
responsibilities during the lead, and the location of the reverse pit stop signal at
Guangzhou North Station was unclear. When the locomotive signal showed a red and
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yellow light, the driver was not prompted to confirm the reverse pit stop signal. The display
of the machine, especially when using the GSM handset to control with Guangzhou North
Station, is not focused, mistakenly listening to "Parking outside Guangzhou North Station"
as "Parking at Guangzhou North Station 4", and communicating the error to the driver
Information and instructions are the main cause of accidents. Station supervisors are not
aware of the critical safety risks, and the large-scale machine grinding in the interval and
the maintenance of the electrical switch in the station are carried out at the same time. In
particular, the key safety risks of the maintenance of the electrical switch on the running
path of the polished vehicle back to the station are not under key prevention and control.
There was no prompt for the duty officer to strengthen the joint control of the vehicle. In
the end, when the driver showed a red light in the reverse direction and the red and yellow
lights in the locomotive signal, the driver illegally pressed the [OK] key of the GYK device
and entered the No. 4 turnout in the station at a speed of 14km / h. The vehicle squeezed
out of the movable rail of the turnout in the reverse position and stopped, resulting in a
C10 accident.”

Step 1: Analyze the accident process and break down the accident into several
consecutive events.
Sample:
Accident 60617 development process after abbreviation:
1. The management of the construction organization process is weak, the
management staff have insufficient work plans, and the management staff
temporarily changes the driver before the construction begins
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2. The driver did not do his due diligence, wrong password and wrong operation
3. Failure of the supervision mechanism, failure to detect driver's operation
errors, and failure of safety precautions
4. Under wrong operation, the train passes the red signal in a fault state
5. Mechanical impact of turnout caused by train impact
6. The train rushed into the signal light and accident C10 occurred

Step 2: Encode the event obtained in step one by IRAB code, refer to Appendix
A.
Accident 60617:

M03 H04 M05 EM34 EM16 C10

Repeat steps 1 and 2 to process all accident reports to obtain Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017)
Accident ID

Causal Factors

40106

H05

EM43

D10

50401

M02

H05

EM43

50521

M03

H10

C10

50702

H03

EM04

EM26

D05

50729

H08

M05

H20

EM07

C24

60322

M05

H08

H06

EM05

D01

60514

M05

EM05

C16

60518

H08

H06

EM05

C12

60617

M03

H04

M05

EM34

86

EM26

D10

EM16

C10

Table 5.2 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued
Accident ID

Causal Factors

61010

M02

H04

EM48

C09

61126

M06

H08

E04

EM02

61221

H08

H20

EM26

D09

70113

H04

EM36

D15

70128

H10

EM26

C09

70602

M05

EM07

EM12

70713

H04

EM34

D15

71011

H04

EM34

C10

30115

H20

EM05

C13

30416

M05

H20

EM28

EM43

D01

30521

M03

M02

H03

EM03

EM25

30604

M03

H04

EM34

C10

30607

H08

EM04

H10

EM07

30810

EM27

H04

EM26

D15

31122

M05

EM17

EM25

EM26

40118

H06

EM44

EM26

C12

40613

H05

EM07

EM22

C02

40623

M05

H06

EM39

EM17

40803

H03

H04

EM01

D02

40902

H19

EM14

EM26

C02

41021

M01

M02

H03

H07

B01

41213

M03

M02

H10

H07

H20

EM05

41220

H20

M05

H06

EM07

EM26

D10

50129

M01

H03

M05

H08

EM29

C15

50226

H17

H03

EM36

D13

87

H06

EM07

C25

C13

C19

C08

C14

EM25

C14

C13

Table 5.3 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued
Accident ID

Causal Factors

50425

M03

M05

H03

EM48

50518

M02

H07

B01

50629

M01

H07

B01

50711

H01

H03

EM28

D12

50726

M05

H03

H17

EM25

D19

50728

M03

M02

H08

EM39

EM25

EM26

50824

M03

M02

H20

EM05

EM26

C13

50826

M01

H01

EM34

C10

50919

M03

H04

EM49

EM29

C23

51004

H17

EM34

C10

51007

H03

M05

H08

EM24

C24

51009

M06

H13

EM10

EM26

C13

51021

H04

EM24

C08

51120

M01

H07

B01

51130

M03

H08

M05

EM37

D09

51212

M03

M02

E01

EM06

EM23

EM39

51218

H01

EM34

C09

51226

M03

H08

M05

H20

EM05

C13

60229

M01

H08

B01

60323

M06

H06

E07

EM23

EM05

C13

60328

M01

H08

B01

60728

H07

M05

EM46

EM22

D02

60913

M03

H13

EM05

H04

EM16

C16

60919

M03

H06

EM29

D10

61006

M03

H06

EM07

H04

EM22

D02

88

C13

C14

C14

Table 5.4 Causal Factors for All Accident (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued
Accident ID

Causal Factors

61102

H06

EM05

D08

61108

M03

H10

EM13

D10

61122

H08

EM43

EM05

C13

70303

M02

H20

EM05

C13

70327

H10

EM29

EM16

D03

70413

H06

EM02

B04

70507

M01

H08

B01

70528

H17

EM43

EM10

C08

70901

M06

H20

EM26

D09

Step 3, according to the sequence of events, add the direction of the accident. The
direction directly reflects the causal connection during the accident. The development of
some accidents is particularly complicated, which will disrupt the sequence of event
development when performing the second step of encoding, so we must rearrange the
causality of event development. This step is also giving direction to the network.
Sample:
Accident 60617: M03 → H04 → M05 → EM34 → EM16 → C10
By processing all data in the same way, the development chain of all accidents
can be obtained, as shown in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.5 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017)
Accident ID

Event Chain

30810

EM27 → H04 → EM26 → D15

51218

H01 → EM34 → C09

50711

H01 → H03 → EM28 → D12

40803

H03 → H04 → EM01 → D02

50702

H03 → EM04 → EM26 → D05

51007

H03 → M05 → H08 → EM24 → C24

51021

H04 → EM24 → C08

71011

H04 → EM34 → C10

70113

H04 → EM36 → D15

70713

H04 → EM34 → D15

40106

H05 → EM43 → D10

40613

H05 → EM07 → EM22 → C02

61102

H06 → EM05 → D08

70413

H06 → EM02 → B04

40118

H06 → EM44 → EM26 → C12

60728

H07 → M05 → EM46 → EM22 → D02

61122

H08 → EM43 → EM05 → C13

61221

H08 → H20 → EM26 → D09

30607

H08 → EM04 → H10 → EM07 → C08

60518

H08 → H06 → EM05 → C12

50729

H08 → M05 → H20 → EM07 → C24

70128

H10 → EM26 → C09

70327

H10 → EM29 → EM16 → D03

51004

H17 → EM34 → C10

70528

H17 → EM43 → EM10 → C08
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Table 5.6 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued
Accident ID

Event Chain

50226

H17 → H03 → EM36 → D13

40902

H19 → EM14 → EM26 → C02

30115

H20 → EM05 → C13

41220

H20 → M05 → H06 → EM07 → EM26 → D10

50826

M01 → H01 → EM34 → C10

50129

M01 → H03 → M05 → H08 → EM29 → C15

41021

M01 → M02 → H03 → H07 → B01

50629

M01 → H07 → B01

51120

M01 → H07 → B01

60229

M01 → H08 → B01

60328

M01 → H08 → B01

70507

M01 → H08 → B01

50401

M02 → H05 → EM43 → EM26 → D10

61010

M02 → H04 → EM48 → C09

70303

M02 → H20 → EM05 → C13

50518

M02 → H07 → B01

30521

M03 → M02 → H03 → EM03 → EM25 → C19

50521

M03 → H10 → C10

60919

M03 → H06 → EM29 → D10

50919

M03 → H04 → EM49 → EM29 → C23

30604

M03 → H04 → EM34 → C10

51212

M03 → M02 → E01 → EM06 → EM23 → EM39 → C14

41213

M03 → M02 → H10 → H07 → H20 → EM05 → C13

50728

M03 → M02 → H08 → EM39 → EM25 → EM26 → C14

60617

M03 → H04 → M05 → EM34 → EM16 → C10
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Table 5.7 Event Chains for All Accidents (Guangzhou, 2013-2017) - continued
Accident ID

Event Chain

60913

M03 → H13 → EM05 → H04 → EM16 → C16

50824

M03 → M02 → H20 → EM05 → EM26 → C13

61006

M03 → H06 → EM07 → H04 → EM22 → D02

61108

M03 → H10 → EM13 → D10

50425

M03 → M05 → H03 → EM48 → C13

51226

M03 → H08 → M05 → H20 → EM05 → C13

51130

M03 → H08 → M05 → EM37 → D09

50726

M05 → H03 → H17 → EM25 → D19

31122

M05 → EM17 → EM25 → EM26 → C14

40623

M05 → H06 → EM39 → EM17 → EM25 → C14

70602

M05 → EM07 → EM12 → C13

30416

M05 → H20 → EM28 → EM43 → D01

60322

M05 → H08 → H06 → EM05 → D01

60514

M05 → EM05 → C16

70901

M06 → H20 → EM26 → D09

60323

M06 → H06 → E07 → EM23 → EM05 → C13

61126

M06 → H08 → E04 → EM02 → H06 → EM07 → C25

51009

M06 → H13 → EM10 → EM26 → C13

5.2 Network Established
Combining the event chains of all accidents, different accidents may have the same events,
such as driver errors, rainy weather, or the same mechanical failure. Combining all the
incident chains of accidents, you can get a network. All the network diagrams in this article
are generated by MATLAB. By converting the contents of Table 5.2 into a matrix, and
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then writing the code, you can quickly complete the drawing work. The results are shown
in Figure 5.2.
The tool used for network construction and mathematical calculation in this study
is MATLAB. The Figure 5.1 shows a screenshot of the software.
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94
Figure 5.1 Network sample.
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95
Figure 5.2 MATLAB UI screen.
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Figure 5.2 is composed of two parts. The lower left corner is a full picture, which
cannot be seen in detail due to space limitations. So, I took a part of it and enlarged it for
explanation.
Node and Edge:
The so-called complex network is actually very simple. The entire network has only
two parts: nodes and edges. The node is the event mentioned above, and the edge is the
causal relationship between the events. The arrows on the lines indicate the direction of
causality. The two ends of the arrows represent the cause and effect of a pair of causal
relations.
Degree and Weight:
The number on the line represents the weight of the edge, because this picture has
not been weighted, so the weight of the edge is 1. Each node has a line connected to other
nodes, the number of lines represents the importance of this node, that is the weight of the
node. And there may be many edges between two nodes, so how many nodes are connected
to this node is the degree of this node.
Shortest path length and Diameter:
There may be no edge connection between the two nodes, but most points will be
connected by other points, then the two nodes connected by the least edge are the shortest
path length between the nodes. The length between the two longest points of the path is the
diameter of the entire graph.
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Clustering coefficient:
The clustering coefficient is used to measure the agglomeration between the surrounding
nodes of a node. The more connections between other nodes connected to a node, the higher
the clustering coefficient. But not all clustering coefficients can be calculated at all points
in all graphs. For example, in some networks, the connectivity between nodes is not rich
enough, it may not be possible to calculate this value.
Mean clustering coefficient is a parameter that measures the agglomeration of the
entire network. It is obtained by calculating the average value of all clustering coefficients
in the network.
Betweenness centrality
betweenness centrality is a parameter used to measure the position of a point. It
means that the shortest path through this point accounts for the percentage of the entire
network. Therefore, the maximum value of betweenness centrality is 1, and betweenness
centrality equal to 1 means that the shortest path of any pair of nodes in this network passes
through this point.
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CHAPTER 6
DATA ANALYSIS

6.1 Overall Accident Analysis
Figure 6.1 is a causation network modeled on 68 railway accidents that occurred between
2013 and 2017 in Guangzhou Railway Group. The 68 accidents were decomposed into 76
nodes and 233 edges, which also means 76 events. In all accidents, they may have happened
many times in different accidents. These events combined a total of 233 control-feedback
loops. Obviously, all of these controls failed in these cases, which led to 68 accidents. It
can be seen in the figure that there are multiple connecting lines with arrows between many
nodes. The arrow means the direction, indicating that one event triggered another. The
presence of multiple lines indicates that the same chain reaction has occurred many times,
which means that the network in this picture has not been weighted.
The network is so complicated, so we analyze the characteristics of the network
through the following sections: degree, strength, path length, clustering coefficient and
betweenness centrality.
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Figure 6.1 Causation network (2013-2017, unweighted).
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6.1.1 Degree and Degree Distribution
Figure 6.2 shows the degree distribution of nodes (events) in all accidents. The highest
degree is EM26 (Train delayed), which is far more than the degree value of other events,
showing that EM26 (Train delayed) is very important in the network. It also shows that
EM26 (Train delayed) appears very frequently in these five years of accidents: as an
accident result, delay is the most common result of train accidents in these five years. As
the cause of accidents, train delays are also the most likely to cause various accidents:
delays can cause confusion in management, train dispatching, and the use of station lines,
causing instability in the entire system and increasing requirements for other safety
controls.
The other common second to fifth accident factors are: H04 (Driver’s operation
mistake), M05 (Not sufficient inspection and Supervision), H08 (Track worker’s
negligence), H03 (Conductor’s mistake). Three of the top five accident factors are staff
factors. It can be seen that the quality of staff is the weakest factor in railway safety in these
five years.
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Degree Distribution (2013-2017 Railway Accidents)
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Figure 6.2 Degree distribution (2013-2017, all accidents).

Figure 6.3 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows
an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~2.122𝑥𝑥 −1.318 ( 𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8722), The top 7.89% factors account for

a majority (53.79%) of all causation relations, and the most (55.26 %) of factors occur only
1–3 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.
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Cumulative Degree Distribution
(2013-2017, Railway Acicdents)
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Figure 6.3 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, all accidents).

6.1.2 Strength and Strength Distribution
Figure 6.4 shows the strength distribution of nodes (events) in all railway accidents over
five years. The strength is weighted twice on the basis of the degree, not only considering
the connectivity of the node in the network (the number of other points connected), but
also considering the strength of the connection (the weight of the edge) and the size of the
end node of the link (the severity of the accident). After weighting twice, it can be found
that the importance of nodes in the network has changed significantly. EM26 (Train
delayed) is no longer higher than other nodes, the most important node becomes H08(Track
worker’s negligence), and the second to fifth causal factors are: EM26 (Train delayed),
M05 (Not sufficient inspection and supervision), EM05 (Train minor damaged), H04
(Driver’s operation mistake). The human factor has occupied the same two positions as the
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equipment factor, and the management factor ranks third, showing the importance of
management factors in the accident.

Strength Distribution (2013-2017 Railway Accidents)
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Figure 6.4 Strength distribution (2013-2017, all accidents).

Figure 6.5 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of weighted
network follows an exponential function as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.7164𝑥𝑥 −1.003 (𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8652). The top

13.16% factors account for a majority (54.07%) of all the times of occurrences, and the
50% of factors occur 1-4 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.
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Cumulative Strength Distribution
(2013-2017, Railway Acicdents)
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Figure 6.5 Cumulative strength distribution (2013-2017, all accidents).
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Figure 6.6 Causation network of railroad accidents (2013-2017, weighted).
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6.1.3 Shortest Path and Diameter
In an unweighted causation network that mixes High-Speed Rail and regular railway
accidents over a five-year period, the average path length is 3.11. This means that causality
related to another factor requires approximately three steps in the network. The average
path of the causality related to the accident is 3.09, which means that about 3 causal factors
are needed to cause the accident. The diameter of the network is 9, and from E01 (Rainy
condition) / 04 (Freezing temperatures) to EM13 (Wagon failure) are the two most distant
nodes in the network. This indicates a possibility: the occurrence of harsh environment
(Rainy condition / Freezing temperatures) can lead to the occurrence of Wagon failure
through nine steps. At the same time, it means that if you want to avoid accidents, you can
strengthen the control at any of the nine nodes.
6.1.4 Clustering Coefficient
Figure 6.7 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of all accidents. The
clustering coefficient of the four nodes reaches 1, and two of them belong to the machine
equipment category, showing that the machine equipment node tends to gather together.
The overall clustering coefficient of the network is 0.4098, which shows that the
aggregation between the nodes is high. Combining the average path of the network
discussed in the previous paragraph is only 3.11, the combination of the two features makes
the entire network very consistent with the characteristics of the small world network. This
means that most factors can influence each other, and it is easy to produce the "resonance"
phenomenon mentioned in the control theory. which means that the influences of the
factors will overlap each other and enlarge, making the entire network particularly fragile.
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Cluster Coefficient
(Railway Accidents, 2013-2017)
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Figure 6.7 Clustering coefficient (2013-2017, all accidents).

6.1.5 Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality indicates a possibility that the probability of this node on the
shortest path connecting a pair of nodes. To a certain extent, Betweenness centrality is the
advanced version of Degrees: Betweenness centrality selects the optimal solution (shortest
path) on the basis of accessibility
Figure 6.8 shows the top 30% of the Betweenness centrality of all railway accident
causation networks. Because weight and direction are considered, Betweenness centrality
can reflect the historical trajectory and possible trajectory of accident development. The
highest ranked EM26 (Train delayed), H06 reflects that a key chain, the untimely track
inspection, is very likely to cause train delays.
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Betweenness Centrality
(Railway Accidents, 2013-2017)
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Figure 6.8 Betweenness centrality (2013-2017, all accidents).

6.2 Annual Accident Analysis
6.2.1 Annual data
According to the annual data report, the following networks were drawn. showing the
causation network from 2013 to 2017. It can be observed that the spatial characteristics of
the network are directly affected by the amount of data: 2013 with the least number of
accidents is also the year with the simplest network structure. The network structure was
also the most complicated in 2015 as the number of accidents increased. In fact, the
limitations of methodology, the reasons why it is called a complex network depends on a
huge number of nodes and edges connecting vertices. And when the network is no longer
complicated, data analysis is impossible.
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Figure 6.9 Causation network (2013-2014, all accidents).
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Figure 6.10 Causation network (2015-2016, all accidents).
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Figure 6.11 Causation network (2017, all accidents).

6.2.2 Annual Comparison
Degree and Strength distribution
Figure 6.12 is a summary chart of the top ten factors each year from 2013 to 2017. Each
factor includes two values, degree-all and strength-all. Degree-all is the sum of degree-in
and degree-out, strength-all is the sum of strength-in and strength-out. The abscissa
includes five years, so through the continuous polyline in the figure, you can observe the
change of several elements in five years: on the whole, the element is in the rising period
from 2015 to 2016, which matches the annual change in the number of accidents. The most
obvious changes are EM26 (Train delayed), M02 (Inadequate safety precautions) and H20
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(Staff left machine/goods/material on the track), which maintained a continuous growth
every year from 2013 to 2015. H03 maintained growth only in 2014-2015. H08 (Track
worker’s negligence) had a short-term growth in 2015-2016, and then fell sharply in 2017.
Also falling are M01 (Inadequate safety education for workers) and M03 (Weak
management), both of which have decreased in 2015-2016.
In 2015, two lines crossed on the graph, both of which are factors H07 (Worker was
working in danger Conditions) and H08 (Track worker’s negligence) belonging to the
human factor category. After the two factors are weighted, the strength value has greatly
increased from the degree value. The same thing happened with H03 in 2014. After
weighting, the importance of H03 in the network has increased.
In addition to changes in railway safety, which can explain changes in element
values, the distribution of accessibility and importance of each element is also directly
related to the size of the network. In 2015-2016, when the network size is large (the amount
of data is large), the line segment is on the ordinate the projection is more scattered. In
2013 and 2017, ten segments each year were concentrated in smaller areas.
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Top 10 Causation Factors of yearly Accidents (2013-2017)
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Figure 6.12 Top 10 Causation factors of annual accident (2013-2017, all accidents).

113

H06

Path Length and Clustering Coefficient
Table 6.1 shows the geometric characteristics of the network, including the network
diameter, the average shortest path length and the clustering coefficient. Depending on the
size and structure of the network, the clustering coefficient is not available in most years.
The average shortest path length is obviously related to the network diameter, and the larger
the diameter, the larger the average shortest path length.
In 2015, due to abundant data and moderate network size, all network
characteristics can be calculated. The average shortest path length and clustering
coefficient can be combined to determine that the 2015 accident causation network
conforms to the characteristics of the small world network. The various elements are
closely connected, and the related influences are likely to cause the "resonance"
phenomenon mentioned in the control theory. Managers need to strengthen the
management of elements with a high clustering coefficient to eliminate security risks.
Table 6.1 Yearly Causation Network Characters Comparison (2013-2017, All Accidents)
Year Diameter

Average
Shortest Path
Length

Cluster Coefficient

2013

5

1.86

N/A

2014

12

4.2

N/A

2015

10

3.3

Average
0.370

C13

H03

M05

0.333 0.167 0.667 0.333

2016

12

4.16

N/A

2017

5

1.19

N/A
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H08

Betweenness Centrality
Table 6.2 summarizes the value of Betweenness centrality ranked in the top nine each year
for five years. The higher the element of Betweenness centrality, the more important it is
in the causal chain of accident transmission. This is also where safety management should
be reinforced.
Table 6.2 Top 9 Betweenness Centrality (2013-2017, All Accidents)
2013

Factors

2014

2015

2016

2017

EM25

0.390

H06

0.629

H08

0.320

H08

0.340

H20

0.148

EM17

0.303

H20

0.552

H03

0.308

H04

0.335 EM26 0.140

EM26

0.303

M05

0.512 EM26 0.288 EM05 0.322 EM05 0.099

M05

0.280

H07

0.468 EM25 0.281

H06

0.303

C13

0.081

H20

0.270

EM07 0.456 EM39 0.265

M05

0.273

H10

0.081

H04

0.230

EM26 0.317

H17

0.173

M03

0.168 EM12 0.059

EM28

0.120

EM39 0.192

M02

0.160

H20

0.102 EM29 0.059

EM03

0.077

H03

0.192

M05

0.137 EM29 0.075 EM07 0.032

EM05

0.063

H10

0.163 EM29 0.104 EM16 0.066 EM16 0.032

6.3 Regular Railway Accidents
Figure 6.13 shows an unweighted causation network for regular railway accidents, which
contains 72 nodes(events) and 180 edges(causalities).
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Figure 6.13 Causation network (2013-2017, regular accidents).

6.3.1 Degree and Degree Distribution
From the characteristics of the network, it can be found that the line density is significantly
higher in the M (Management) and H (Human Factor) node areas than in other areas,
reflecting that the intensity of causal connections related to M (Management) and H
(Human Factor) is higher than in other areas. Statistics also prove this: Four of the top 6
nodes in the degree distribution (shown in Figure 6.14) are Human factors. In the statistical
data by category, EM (Equipment and Machine)-related causal connections account for the
highest proportion, 42.9%. However, the average number of connections on each node is
only 4.06, which means that an average of 4.06 nodes are connected to EM (Equipment
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and Machine) nodes, only slightly higher than the network average level (3.81). The M
(Management) and H (Human Factor) series nodes account for 29.8% and 12.7% of the
causal connections, but the average number of connections is 6.83 and 7, which is much
higher than the average level in the network.

Degree Distribution
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Figure 6.14 Degree distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).

Figure 6.15 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows
an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~2.0764𝑥𝑥 −1.451 ( 𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8505), The top 8.33% factors account for
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a majority (57.55%) of all causation relations, and the most (52.78 %) of factors occur only
1–2 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.

Cumulative Degree Distribution
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Figure 6.15 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).

6.3.2 Strength and Strength Distribution
Figure 6.16 shows the dual-weighted network. Compared with the unweighted network,
the number of edges in the weighted network (Figure 6.17) has been significantly reduced.
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Figure 6.16 Causation network (2013-2017, regular accidents, weighted).

The numerical changes that are greatly affected by weighting are M02 (Inadequate
safety precautions, 8 as degree, 16 as strength), M03 (Weak management, 7 as degree, 15
as strength), H08 (Track worker’s negligence, 11 as degree, 20.8 as strength), EM05 (Train
minor damaged, 9 as degree, 19.6 as strength). This proves once again that the frequency
and severity of accidents need to be included in the analysis of the cause of the accident. It
needs to be noted that M01 and M03, both of which have only Out-Strength values, show
that the lack of training and weak management only affects other factors, but have not been
affected by other factors. The average value of strength is 5.41, which means that on
average each causal factor affects other factors 5.4 times.

119

Strength Distribution
(2013-2017 Regular Railway Accidents)
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Figure 6.17 Strength distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).

Figure 6.18 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of Network
follows an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.6991𝑥𝑥 −1.072 (𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8274). The top 15.28% factors

account for a majority (54.48%) of all the times of occurrences, and 33.33% of factors
occur only 1–2 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.
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Figure 6.18 Cumulative strength distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).

6.3.3 Shortest Path and Diameter
In the regular railway accident causation network, the average path length is 2.77. This
means that the causality related to another factor is about three steps in the network. The
average path of the causality related to the accident is 3.10, which means that about 3 causal
factors are needed to cause the accident. The network diameter is 7, and from E01 (Rainy
condition) to C10 (Train over signal or stop sign) / 13 (A collision occurred while the train
was running) are the two furthest pairs of nodes in the network. This indicates a possibility:
the rainy weather can lead to the accident C15 (Braking system malfunction) / 23
(Locomotive not tested) through 7 steps. At the same time, it means that if you want to
avoid accidents, you can strengthen the control at any of the 7 nodes.
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6.3.4 Clustering Coefficient
Figure 6.19 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of regular railway
accidents. Four of the top six factors belong to human factors, and all of them are greater
than 0.3, which indicates that the factors of human factors tend to be clustered together.
The aggregation coefficient of the entire network is 0.3562, which is much larger than the
random network of the same size. The aggregation coefficient higher than 0.3 and the
average path length less than 3 indicate that this network conforms to the characteristics of
a small-world network. This means that elements can easily affect each other, thereby
breaking the normal operation of the system.
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Figure 6.19 Clustering coefficient distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).
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EM26

6.3.5 Betweenness Centrality
Figure 6.20 shows the top 30% of the Betweenness centrality of regular railway accident
causation networks. The highest ranked EM26 (Train delayed), H04 (Driver’s operation
mistake) reflects a critical chain that the mistake of the train driver is very likely to cause
a delay in the train.
In addition, four of the top five Betweenness centralities are all human factors,
showing the importance of human factors in regular railway accidents. Strengthening the
management of human factors will more effectively improve railway safety.
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Figure 6.20 Betweenness centrality distribution (2013-2017, regular accidents).
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6.4 High-Speed Rail Accidents Analysis
The High-Speed Rail accidents selected from all accident reports are broken down into 35
events and 80 causal links according to the method described in Chapter 4. It is then
modeled into 35 nodes and 80 edges to form the network shown in Figure 6.21

Figure 6.21 Causation network (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).

6.4.1 Degree and Degree Distribution
As shows in the Figure 6.22, the factors with the highest connectivity in the High-Speed
Rail accident (top 10%) are EM26 (Train delayed) M05 (Not sufficient inspection and
Supervision) EM07 (The risk of the line) H08 (Track worker’s negligence) and H04
(Driver’s operation mistake) (the last three have the same degree value), showing that train
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delay is still the main factor for High-Speed Rail accidents, driver errors and supervision
the shortcomings reflect the internal management problems of High-Speed Rail and the
impact of employees on safety. This confirms the previous assumption that the large
number of newly purchased high-speed trains has a negative impact on operational safety.
In the equipment category, EM26 (Train delayed), EM07 (The risk of the line),
EM05 (Train minor damaged), EM34 (Train passed red signal) are the most connected
factors, which correspond to the slight loss in the accident (train delay and slight damage
to the train), signal system and line safety.
Among the human factors, the biggest threats to safety are H04 (driver misuse),
H08 (track worker negligence) and H20 (employee left items on the track).
The most frequent factor in the management process is M05 (Not sufficient
inspection and Supervision), which means a lack of inspection and supervision. A large
number of new lines and newly purchased vehicles have resulted in accidents due to
insufficient management power.
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Degree Distribution
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Figure 6.22 Degree distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).

Figure 6.23 illustrates that cumulative node degree distribution of Network follows
a power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.6362𝑥𝑥 −1.573 (𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8539). The top 14.29% factors account for

a majority (58.33%) of all causation relations, and the most (65.71%) of factors occur only
1–2 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.
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Figure 6.23 Cumulative degree distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).

6.4.2 Strength and Strength Distribution
Through weighting (adding consideration to the network edge and the severity of the
accident), the weighted network is obtained as shown in Figure 6.24. The most important
point in the network (top 10%) is EM26 (Train delayed), M05 (Not sufficient inspection
and Supervision), H04 (Driver’s operation mistake)
In the equipment category, the strength value of EM34 (Train passed red signal)
exceeds EM05 (Train minor damaged) after weighting, showing that line safety is more
important for the safety of High-Speed Rail than line safety.
Among human factors, H06 (Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time)
surpassed H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track), becoming the third most
important human factor affecting the safety of High-Speed Rail.
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Among management factors, the most important factor is M05 (Not sufficient
inspection and supervision), followed by M03 (Weak management), M02 (Inadequate
safety precautions) and M06 (Weak maintenance system).
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Figure 6.24 Strength distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).

Figure 6.25 illustrates that cumulative node strength distribution of network follows
an power law as 𝑃𝑃(𝑘𝑘)~1.4823𝑥𝑥 −1.381 (𝑅𝑅2 = 0.8193). The top 14.29% factors account for

a majority (54.29%) of all the times of occurrences, and the most (54.29%) of factors occur
only 1–2 times. The network has typical small-world model characteristics.
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Figure 6.25 Cumulative strength distribution (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).

6.4.3 Shortest Path and Diameter
In the High-Speed Rail accident causation network, the average shortest path length is 2.21.
This means that the causality related to another factor is about two steps in the network.
The average path of the causality related to the accident is 2.56, which means that about 23 causal factors are needed to cause the accident. The network diameter is 5, from E04
(Freezing temperatures) to H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track) /
M02(Inadequate safety precautions) and M02 (Inadequate safety precautions) / M05 (Not
sufficient inspection and supervision), H20 (Staff left machine/goods/material on the track)
to C12 (Locomotive broken shaft, key components fall off) are the five furthest pairs of
nodes in the network. This points to several possibilities: extreme cold weather can lead to
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the presence of remnants that affect safety on the rails in five steps or cause insufficient
safety precautions. Inadequate management and inspection or misplaced items on the rails
will lead to accident C13 (A collision occurred while the train was running) through the
transmission of five factors.
6.4.4 Clustering Coefficient
Figure 6.26 shows the clustering coefficient in the causation network of the High-Speed
Rail accident. The clustering coefficient of three of the five nodes reaches 1, and the other
nodes are also greater than 0.3, showing that these five elements are highly clustered. The
average aggregation coefficient of the network is as high as 0.73, and the average path of
the network discussed in the previous paragraph is only 2.21. The combination of the two
features makes the entire network very consistent with the characteristics of the small world
network. This means that most factors easily interact with each other and need to be strictly
controlled to eliminate the "resonance" phenomenon in system operation.
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Figure 6.26 Clustering coefficient (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).
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EM07

6.4.5 Betweenness Centrality
Compared with the networks in Sections 5.2 and 5.4, the causation network of the HighSpeed Rail is smaller in scale and the path selection for accident development will be less,
so the Betweenness centrality in the network is higher. The difference is that the highest
value of Betweenness centrality in High-Speed Rail accidents is M05, which shows that
daily maintenance and supervision are the key factors in High-Speed Rail accidents. Figure
6.27 describes a possible accident development chain: inadequate maintenance (M05)
caused train delays (EM26), and railway line hazards (EM07) caused by employees leaving
items on the rails (H20).
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Figure 6.27 Betweenness centrality (2013-2017, High-Speed Rail accidents).
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6.5 Comparison between Regular and High-Speed Rail Accident
This part is a comparison of the causes of accidents between regular railways and HighSpeed Rail. Two network characteristics are used for comparison: node strength and
betweenness centrality, all data comes from the previous chapters.
6.5.1 Overview
Strength is a measure of the frequency of node connections. Compared with the degree, it
can better reflect the importance of nodes in the network. This also means that the intensity
represents the influence of the incident on the accident. For each type of accident, three
types of accident causal factors were selected: equipment and machinery, human factors,
and management factors. The total strength of these three factors in the network is 84.52%
(regular) and 82.06% (High-Speed Rail). The two types of factors that are not discussed
here are the environment and the type of accident. The impact on the development of the
accident is very small and can be ignored.
According to the comparison of categories, the proportion of High-Speed Rail
equipment is 2.12% higher than that of general railway, the gap is very small, but the total
proportion of management elements is lower than that of regular railway 4.38%. A
reasonable explanation is that the use of automated systems, such as train control systems,
is higher than regular railways, so the dependence of High-Speed Rail on management is
reduced.
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6.5.2 Equipment Factors

The table above (Table 6.3) lists the top five equipment factors in the High-speed Railroad
and regular railroad accident network. The comparison found that the top five factors in
the High-Speed Rail network accounted for 29.07% of the total, much higher than the
regular railway's 17.12%. Shows a high concentration of equipment risk. Among them, the
EM26 ranking rose to first, and the proportion has also increased significantly, showing
the importance of High-Speed Rail for train delays for High-Speed Rail accidents. In the
High-Speed Rail network, due to the application of the automatic driving control system,
the minimum driving interval is 3 minutes (the design value of the CTCS-3 system, the
minimum interval in practical application is 4 minutes, see the Beijing-Shanghai HighSpeed Rail), while the regular line train interval For 7 minutes (CTCS-0 / 1 system), any
delay of trains longer than three minutes is a huge security threat to the High-Speed Rail
network.
Table 6.3 Equipment & Machine Node Strength Comparison Between High-speed Rail
and Regular Railroad Accident
Rank

Percentage of node strength (Equipment & machine)
Regular

High-Speed Rail

1

EM05

19.6

5.02%

EM26

8.2

7.54%

2

EM26

19.2

4.92%

EM07

6.6

6.07%

3

EM25

10.8

2.77%

EM05

6.4

5.89%

4

EM34

8.8

2.26%

EM34

6.4

5.89%

5

EM07

8.4

2.15%

EM43

4

3.68%

Summary

17.12%

29.07%

Category

37.99%

40.11%
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The proportions of EM07 (risk of the line), EM34 (Train passed red line) and EM43
(infrastructure damaged) are significantly higher than those of regular railway, showing
the high dependence of High-Speed Rail on infrastructure and signal system. As a complex
technical system, High-Speed Rail highly depends on the cooperation of various parts of
the system. Infrastructure, power system, signal system, train control system, and
communication system are all important functional parts, which are crucial to the safety of
High-Speed Rail.
6.5.3 Human Factor
Table 6.4 Human Factors Comparison Between High-speed Rail and Regular Railroad
Accident
Rank

Percentage of node strength (Human Factor)
Regular

High-Speed Rail

1

H08

20.8

5.33%

H04

7.5

6.90%

2

H03

17.3

4.43%

H08

7.4

6.81%

3

H20

14.9

3.82%

H06

6.4

5.89%

4

H06

13.8

3.54%

H20

4.2

3.86%

5

H04

13.7

3.51%

H10

3.2

2.94%

Summary

20.64%

26.40%

Category

30.27%

30.08%

Human factors and equipment show a similar pattern, and the top five High-Speed Rail are
more concentrated. The biggest change is H04 (driver make mistake), which accounts for
3.38% more than regular railway. It shows that the wrong operation of the driver has the
greatest threat to the safety of the High-Speed Rail, or that the professional level of the
driver cannot fully meet the requirements of the High-Speed Rail. Factors that vary greatly
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in human factors are H06 (Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time) and H08
(Track worker ’s negligence), which involves maintenance staff not meeting maintenance
requirements. In general, human factors have the same impact on High-Speed Rail as
regular railways, but the impact is more concentrated on each factor.
6.5.4 Management
The management factor data proves that there is no obvious defect in the management
system and policies of High-Speed Rail. Compared with regular railways, the impact of
overall management factors on safety is decreasing. The only increasement in M05 (Not
sufficient inspection and supervision) can be regarded as the personal negligence of
managers: the constraints (regulations) for protecting safety exist because the factors of
arena do not play a role in safety management.
Table 6.5 Management Factors Comparison Between High-speed Rail and Regular
Railroad Accident
Rank

Percentage of node strength (Management)
Regular

High-Speed Rail

1

M05

19.2

4.92%

M05

7.6

6.99%

2

M02

16

4.10%

M03

2.2

2.02%

3

M03

15

3.85%

M02

2.1

1.93%

4

M01

10

2.56%

M06

1

0.92%

5

M06

3.2

0.82%

Summary

16.25%

11.87%

Category

16.25%

11.87%
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6.5.5 Regular Railroad Accidents
Observing the safety status of regular railway from another angle, the strength values of
equipment factors are evenly dispersed in each equipment factor, showing that the overall
safety level is low. The requirements for safety management are higher, because there is
no key part to strengthen attention. This can be confirmed by the distribution of the value
of betweenness centrality. Table 6.6 shows the top ten elements of the value of betweenness
centrality among High-Speed Rail and regular railways. The highest value of betweenness
centrality of High-Speed Rail is 0.388, while that part of regular railway is only 0.253. The
value of clustering coefficient also shows the same characteristics: the clustering
coefficient of the High-Speed Rail network is 0.7333, and the regular railway is only
0.3562. It shows that the causation network elements of the High-Speed Rail are more
concentrated, while the causation network structure of the regular railway is more scattered.
Table 6.6 Betweenness Centrality (High- Speed Rail and Regular Rail)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Betweenness Centrality
HSR
Regular
M05 0.389 EM26 0.253
EM26 0.379
H04 0.252
H20 0.262
H03 0.154
EM07 0.246
H06 0.130
H04 0.210
H08 0.111
EM05 0.179 M05 0.111
H08 0.153 EM05 0.099
EM34 0.129 EM29 0.092
H06 0.077 EM25 0.081
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CHAPTER 7
CASE DISCUSSION

The previous network analysis has provided an overall description of the causes of different
types of railway accidents. The following themes are aimed at analyzing the main problems
found in network analysis. By combining specific cases, or comparing with the successful
experience of other industries or countries, it is expected that strategic recommendations
can be formed to help improve operational safety.

7.1 Training
In the network analysis in the last chapter, human factors show its great importance in
High-Speed Rail accidents. Three of the top five High-Speed Rail accidents are caused by
human factors (including management), and the proportion exceeds the equipment factor.
These three factors are M05, not sufficient inspection and supervision, 6.99%) H04
(driver's operation mistake, 6.90%) and H08 (track worker's negligence, 6.81%).
Moreover, betweenness' centrality value is also very high, ranking respectively the 1st, 5th
and 3rd places of causation network. This means that by controlling these three factors, the
loss of accidents on High-Speed Rail can be reduced by at least 20%.
7.1.1 Lion Ocean Tunnel Accident
The problem of weak human factors has been a symptom since the early stages of HighSpeed Rail construction. In the 7.23 Wenzhou train collision accident that occurred in
2011, the illegal operation of maintenance staff and the negligence of the drivers of the
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accident EMU under abnormal operating conditions are the reasons for the accident. This
situation continued at least until the “lion ocean tunnel accident” happened. At the
beginning of 2018, a High-Speed Rail accident occurred within the jurisdiction of
Guangzhou Railway Group. The direct cause of the accident was equipment failure of the
power system. However, a large number of personnel factors have been exposed in
emergency response such as maintenance and rescue after the accident.
Table 7.1 shows a record of an accident. (Liu, 2020) Accident happened on March
5, 2018, around 7 AM, a northbound High-Speed Rail train from Shenzhen to Guangzhou
was stuck in the Lion Ocean tunnel when the power supply was cut off unexpectedly.
According to the Accident Log, the catenary wire fell off and broken and/or damaged many
pantographs and other equipment from the affected train. All High-Speed Rail trains along
the Shen-Guang line are composed of Electric Multiple Units (EMU). With the power
failure occurred in the tunnel, the entire segment of High-Speed Rail line is out of service,
including the trains operating in the opposite direction. After emergency repairs, the line
resumed operation eight hours after the accident.

138

Table 7.1 Accident Log of Lion Tunnel Accident
Time
D (day)
T (time)
1 min
3 mins
10 mins
20 mins
55 mins
1 hour 15 mins
1 hour 30 mins
1 hour 40 mins
1 hour 50 mins
1 hour 55 mins
2 hours 30 mins
2 hours 35 mins
2 hours 50 mins
3 hours 35 mins
3 hours 40 mins
4 hours 10 mins
4 hours 15 mins
4 hours 45 mins
5 hours 15 mins
5 hours 20 mins
5 hours 30 mins
6 hours 15 mins
6 hours 25 mins
7 hours 10 mins
7 hours 20 mins
7 hours 50 mins
D Day Night
D+1 Day Night

Log
Accident occurred in a tunnel near the sea. A short circuit caused by a
failure of equipment that supplies power to the train and at the same time
damage to the equipment on the roof of the affected vehicle;
The entire line stops running due to loss of power;
All railway network informed;
The maintenance technicians from the affected train inspected the vehicle
and overhead wire;
Reported pantograph damaged on affected train;
A rescue train was arranged by the control center;
Affected train request for rescue;
The rescue train departed;
The first maintenance team arrived;
The maintenance team reported that the accident was more serious than
previously understood. The first repair plan developed;
The second maintenance team arrived;
Maintenance team expected repair would be finished after 60
minutes;
The maintenance team applied to board the train roof for repairs;
Rescue train stopped at the nearby station;
The maintenance team began to climb the train roof for repairs;
The first repair plan failed as damages exceeded expectations;
The second repair plan developed; repair time unpredictable;
The control center arranged passenger train to transfer passengers from
affected train;
The second repair plan failed due to improper repair equipment.
The third repair plan developed;
The rescue train started again;
The passenger transferring train departure for the scene;
The passenger transferring train arrived at the scene;
The rescue train arrived;
The third repair plan failed due to inappropriate repair process.
The fourth repair plan developed;
Passenger transfer finished;
Transfer train arrived station nearby;
The rescue train leaving with accident train;
The team completed the repair and started to supply power;
The first train passed the accident section at a lower speed;
The repairs to the damaged equipment and facilities continued;
Repair finished; the line resumed normal operation.

Source: Lv and Liu, 2020
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The maintenance technology and judgment of the on-board engineer exposed by
the accident were not qualified. Even the emergency maintenance team, which was
supposed to be the best engineering staff, failed to complete the maintenance task in time.
The impact of the accident lasted until midnight the next day, and the line was restored to
the state before the accident almost 48 hours later.
7.1.2 Operating Pressure
The human factor problem is caused by two reasons. First, the fast-growing High-Speed
Rail network. The chart lists the procurement of new High-Speed Rail lines and vehicles
from 2013 to 2017. Within five years, China has newly opened High-Speed Rail lines of
3,000 kilometers and purchased up to 1,300 High-Speed Rail EMUs (as shown in Figure
7.1 and Figure 7.2), each The EMU consists of 8 or 16 cars. EMUs purchased within three
years have almost doubled the number of EMUs in China. This kind of complicated and
sophisticated equipment purchased in a large amount of time is a huge challenge for drivers
and maintenance. This directly aggravates the work intensity of the existing staff, and also
causes a shortage of maintenance and operation staff. According to estimates by railway
insiders in 2014, the shortage of mechanized mechanics is about 7,000.
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Figure 7.1 Length of High-Speed Rail in Guangzhou Railway Group.
Source: Guangdong Railway Group, 2015-2019.
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Figure 7.2 New purchase EMUs in China (2013-2017).
Source: China State Railway Group Company, Ltd., 2013-2017.
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7.1.3 Absence of Internal Training System
In the management system of China's High-Speed Rail, training has not received the
attention it deserves. In the structure of China Railway Corporation, there is no department
responsible for staff training. The existing staff department is only responsible for the
recruitment of management staff of the head office. In regional companies, the training
situation has also undergone major changes: Since 2004, the training institutions under the
Guangzhou Railway Group have been reformed in a market-oriented manner. The internal
training institutions of the railway system managed by the former Ministry of Railways
have been transformed into part of the national public education system. After the reform,
2,500 students graduated from an educational institution named "Guangzhou Railway
Vocational and Technical College" at 2017. 40% of the 200 people leave the transportation
industry, and another 60% of the trained staff are employed by more than ten subway
companies in the Pearl River Delta region and railway companies in Hong Kong and
Hainan. In 2015-2019, Guangzhou Railway Group recruited more than 2,000 people, and
even more than 4,000 people at its peak. Most of them were college-level technical staff.
(as shows in Figure 7. 3) Which does not include graduates who have signed a work
contract for training in the above institutions since the start of school. There is a huge gap
between the demand for technical staff and the graduates of professional training
institutions. In order to supplement the redundancy of employees, Guangzhou Railway
Group had to recruit people from the society. Although the number can meet the
requirements, due to the lack of training of professional institutions, the staff will not be
qualified for professional technical positions in the short term. After losing its own local
training school, the daily training of all railway employees of Guangzhou Railway Group
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was organized by the national management agency "China Railway Corporation", but the
efficiency and scale of the training decreased compared with before. The gap between
training capacity and business needs should be planned for a long time to ensure that highquality employees will greatly improve railway safety.
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Figure 7.3 Recruitment in Guangzhou Railway Group (2015-2019).
Resource: Guangdong Railway Group, 2015-2019.

The negative impact of the absence of training institutions on employee quality is
reflected in two aspects: qualification training and continue training. As one of 18 regional
companies, Guangzhou Railway Company has about 147,000 employees and about 3,0005,000 new employees each year. It is inferred that the annual recruitment of new employees
of the national railway is about 41,600-69,300. Consider the difference between academic
education and the actual situation of the industry. It is difficult to ensure that these new
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employees have the professional skills to engage in the railway industry, so the professional
qualification training for new employees is a necessary part of ensuring the quality of
employees. In the existing Chinese railway management system, the only professional
training institution is located in Wuhan, Hubei Province, established in September 2014.
The annual training capacity is 14,000. Compared with the total number of employees in
the railway system of 2.04 million, this training capability is far from meeting the needs of
employee training. At the same time, the technical system of High-Speed Rail is still
evolving, the technology transfer phase is gradually ending, the proportion of localization
is increasing, and the technology is constantly maturing. At the same time, new equipment
(such as new traction power supply technology and new EMU vehicles) is continuously
put into use. This requires that employees should be continuously trained to adapt their
vocational skills to changing needs. And regional companies, such as Guangzhou Railway
Company, have lost their own training institutions. The only training institutions in the
country have very limited capacity. Therefore, the continuing education of employees
cannot be guaranteed.
7.1.4 External Experience
Positive cases from the aviation industry may have inspired railway operators and policy
makers. FAA statistics show that human causes account for 80% of accidents in the
aviation industry. The aviation accident rate in China decreased from 5.42 per million flight
hours between 1980 and 1985 to 0.19 per million flight hours between 2000 and 2005, and
there was no flight accident for three consecutive years from 2005 to 2007. During this
period, China established the Civil Aviation Safety Academy of China, a training
institution dedicated to safety training. In addition, the Civil Aviation Administration of
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China also invested 250 million (RMB) to establish flight training centers in major airlines
such as Air China, China Eastern Airlines, China Southern Airlines, Hainan Airlines, and
Civil Aviation University. At the same time, the Civil Aviation Administration actively
promotes airlines, airports, air traffic control and other agencies to increase investment and
establish their own training institutions and systems. It is these investments in human
resources that have successfully improved the safety level of the aviation industry.

7.2 Equipment
The previous network analysis results show that the proportion of device factors in the
network exceeds 40%. Especially in the causation network of High-Speed Rail, the outdegree ratio of equipment factors has reached 43.75%, indicating that equipment factors in
High-Speed Rail accidents are the first major safety hazard.
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7.2.1 Immature Technology

Figure 7.4 General Hype Cycle for technology.
Source: Gartner, 2019.

The hype cycle is a product cycle proposed by the business consulting company Gartner
(Tarkovskiy., 2020), which describes the expected value change of a new technology at
different stages. Although many critics point out that this model lacks data support, it still
provides a way to describe technical products. As shown in Figure 7.4, new technologies
are always expected to be high in the early stages of development and touted by the market.
When the failure or performance of a technical product fails to meet market expectations,
the attention and capital investment received by the product will decrease until the new
technology gradually matures and is recognized by the people and the market. Observe the
development of High-Speed Rail in China from the perspective of product maturity, the
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High-Speed Rail experienced exactly this period of adaptation, development stage, many
failures, and unstable performance, indicating the immaturity of the product.
7.2.2 Incomplete Transfer
According to widely accepted views, the development of High-Speed Rail technology in
China is actually a government-led technology transfer. From 2004 to 2005, the first time
China introduced High-Speed Rail technology from three countries to the period of this
study (2013-2017), only ten years have passed. For China, the High-Speed Rail is a brand
new, complex, and the fastest transportation vehicle ever on the ground. No matter how
fast and how large this system is. Ten years is not enough to fully master such a brand-new
technical product. As shown in the Table 7.2, although China announced in 2010 that it has
successfully developed a new generation of EMU-CRH380 with independent intellectual
property rights. But in fact, this model is still based on the imported model. Some key
technologies in vehicles, such as bogies and train control systems, are still imported from
abroad. To some extent, the EMU technology of this period is still a collection of
multinational technologies and products in China. Until seven years after CRH380 was in
operation, China once again declared that the fully-developed standard EMU "Fuxing" was
officially put into operation. The High-Speed Rail technology transfer was not really
completed until this moment.,
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Table 7.2 Second Generation High-Speed Rail Models and Their Key Features
Series

CRH380A

CRH380B

Advanced Model CRH380A CRH380AL CRH380B CRH380BL
Manufactory

CSR Qingdao Sifang

CNR Changchun

Original model

CRH2C Phase2

CRH3

Manufactured time2010-1011 2010-2013
Running time

2012

CRH380C
CRH380 CL
CNR Changchun

2010-2013

2010.9.30 2011.6.30 2012.10.9 2011.1.13

2011-2013

2012-2014

2011

2013
4M4T

6M2T

14M2T

4M4T

8M8T

8M8T

Capacity

480

1028/1061

450

1043

1053

9600kW 20440kW 9600kW 18400kW

Speed
Running count

350/380 km/h

350/380 km/h

41

41

95

BST

CRH3C & CRH380BL ZEFIRO 380

Format

Power

CRH380D

102

19200kW
350/380 km/h

350/380 km/h

25

70

Source: Liu and Lv, 2014.

7.2.3 Radical Development Plan
The policy did not match the development of the High-Speed Rail well. On the contrary,
the aggressive policy amplified the potential safety hazards of the equipment.
At a time when the product was not mature enough, China did not adopt a reliable
small-scale experimental operation to discover equipment and operational vulnerabilities.
Instead, it was built quickly under the direction of a strong manager. The Table 7.3 shows
the main points of China's long-term railway development plan. It can be said that policy
makers launched railway development plans in 2004, 2008 and 2016 respectively. The
target time points of the three plans are all in 2020, but the planning targets of the railways
change greatly. The planned railway scale is getting bigger and bigger. The average annual
construction length is gradually increasing. According to the 2004 plan, an average of 400
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kilometers of High-Speed Rail are constructed each year, and according to the revised plan
in 2008, this number has increased to 1,200 kilometers, and it has doubled in 2016, almost
four times the 2004 plan.
Table 7.3 Railway Network Planning For 2020 In Different Years
2004 Plan
Plan Year

2004 Plan

2016 Plan
(2008 Revision)

High-Speed Rail Grid

4+4

Intercity Passenger 3 metropolitan areas
Railway
Beijing; Shanghai;
Guangzhou
(Center City)

4+4

8+8

8 metropolitan areas
Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Changsha,
Chengdu, Zhengzhou,
Wuhan, Xi'an, Xiamen

All City with
population over
0.5M

Network Length(km)

100000

120000

150000

High-Speed Rail
Length(km)

12000

16000

30000

Current Length
(Network)

75000

86000

19000

405

1396

121000

Current Length
(High-Speed Rail)
Source: State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2004, 2008, 2016.

Bold is not just a plan, the Figure 7.5 shows the progress of the construction every
year, you can see the "Chinese speed" in the construction of High-Speed Rail. As
mentioned in the previous section, 1600 high-speed trains were added in three years, and
the tracks of High-Speed Rail were extended by 10,000 kilometers. Excessive pursuit of
construction speed compresses the development and testing time of various supporting
products, which in turn causes hidden safety hazards. There have been examples of
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accidents caused by tight construction schedules. The official 7.23 accident investigation
report believes that the main reason for the accident is the serious design flaws in the train
control equipment. The investigation team believes that the management department (the
Ministry of Railways at that time) "rushed the schedule and progress in the railway
construction and unilaterally pursued the construction speed of the project. Insufficient
attention to security ". The technical department of the Ministry of Railways, which is
responsible for the review of train control equipment, did not comply with the
specifications when reviewing the equipment. In the case of "urgent line construction
schedule requirements, urged by relevant departments", the equipment was irregularly
reviewed. These factors caused the non-compliant design and installation of train control
equipment, resulting in the 7.23 accident.

CHINA HSR Construction Progress
(2008-2019)
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2015

2016

2017

2018

Cumulative length

Figure 7.5 High-speed Rail yearly construction progress (2008-2019).
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7.2.4 Imperfect Maintenance
Poor maintenance of equipment is another important factor that affects equipment safety.
Part of the problem comes from the maintenance staff, which has been discussed before.
The important changes in the maintenance policy during this period also caused potential
safety hazards to the equipment.
Lu Chunfang, as the deputy director of the Ministry of Railways of China,
introduces the maintenance system of the China EMU, which is divided into five levels of
maintenance according to the running time or running journey. The specific requirements
are as follows table.

Table 7.4 High-speed Rail Maintain System in CHINA
China EMU Maintenance Classes
Level

Condition

Ⅰ

Every running 4000km or 48 hours

Ⅱ

Monthly Maintenance

Ⅲ

Running 0.6 million km or 1.5 years

Ⅳ

Running 1.2 million km or 3 years

Ⅴ

Running 2.4 million km or 6 years

Source: Lu, 2015.

The maintenance cost of a series of EMUs (8-car group) is 15 million RMB per
year, accounting for 10% of the purchase price of EMUs. The annual maintenance cost of
EMUs trains in the entire system is 39 billion RMB, while the total liabilities of China
Railway Corporation in 2016 were 4.3 trillion RMB, and the corporate debt ratio was 64%.
Due to the pressure of operating costs, China Railway Corporation has extended the high151

level repair cycle interval of EMUs from 600,000 kilometers to 1.2 million kilometers in
2015, while compressing the maintenance time of various levels by 30% -40%. The
operation time of routine rapid maintenance (level 1 maintenance) is required to be
controlled within 2 hours, and the maintenance content has also been reduced. In addition,
not only the maintenance policy of EMU, the maintenance frequency of ordinary passenger
cars and trucks has been reduced by 10% -30%. The maintenance location is also changing
from the manufacturer to the maintenance department of the railway system. The
maintenance location of EMUs used to be at the manufacturer, and now the Railway Group
Corporation is constructing multiple facilities nationwide for maintenance. The relocation
of maintenance sites brings financial benefits, but for railway systems with weaker
maintenance capabilities than manufacturers, the maintenance and repair pressure of more
than 2,600 EMUs, 50,000 ordinary passenger cars, and 900,000 trucks is definitely a
challenge.
Another hidden danger of maintenance lies in maintenance technology. The
aforementioned Lion Ocean Tunnel accident exposed the threat of equipment maintenance
by maintenance technology. The cause of the accident was the accelerated aging of the
High-Speed Rail power source "catenary" in the high-salt environment in the coastal
tunnel. The accident train damaged catenary when passing the line and lost power.
Catenary's maintenance and daily inspection found no problems. In the daily operation of
China's High-Speed Rail, there is a "no-load inspection vehicle run" before the revenue
trains running. The problem is that this kind of routine maintenance is done at low speed
through the railway line. This kind of train operation itself will use line equipment, which
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creates a paradox: Is there any way to check and maintain the line after the maintenance
vehicle passes?
7.2.5 Social Factors
In addition to the natural environment, social factors are also important factors affecting
the safety of High-Speed Rail equipment. As more and more cities are connected by HighSpeed Rail, the length of inevitable lines built in urban areas is also increasing. The
complexity of the urban environment and the impact of human activities have also affected
the safety of High-Speed Rail. The most fragile part of the High-Speed Rail is its power
system. The catenary is composed of electrical components and has a complex structure
that must be exposed to the air. It is easily affected by the activities of urban residents.
Within two days in 2017, February 20 and 21, the High-Speed Rail in the Zhengzhou area
had 16 incidents caused by light objects hanging on the catenary, causing a total of seven
trains to be delayed and the railway interrupted running for up to 1 hour 23 minutes.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

This chapter summarizes the results of this research, including theoretical contributions,
railway (High-Speed Rail) safety features and strategic recommendations. In the future
research, the methodology and scope of research will be discussed.

8.1 Conclusion
8.1.1 Railway & High-Speed Rail Safety
Data analysis shows that the annual change of railway accidents (including High-Speed
Rail) is obvious, and it is mainly affected by equipment reliability and staff factors. The
main accident causes of High-Speed Rail and general railways have no significant
differences in categories, with equipment factors accounting for approximately 40% and
human factors accounting for approximately 30%. However, there are obvious differences
in specific accident factors. The main reasons include negligence of staff (including drivers
and maintenance staff), and the reliability of the equipment is not high. Compared with
traditional railway accidents, the impact of Conductor on safety has been greatly weakened,
but the impact of driver errors has increased, and the frequency of failure to receive timely
maintenance is also higher than traditional railways. The delay of trains has shown a higher
impact on the safe operation of High-Speed Rail, while the impact of minor damage has
declined. Overall, the safety of high-speed trains is more sensitive to the schedule (time),
the requirements for maintenance are higher, and the requirements for the quality and
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maintenance of drivers are higher. It shows the characteristics of the High-Speed Rail as a
complex advanced technical complex.
8.1.2 Strategy Recommendation
1. The frequency of policy changes should be more moderate, including construction
and procurement plans.
Chinese policymakers have a preference for eagerly accomplishing some iconic,
compelling achievements to enhance their reputation and promotion opportunities.
Meanwhile, building a large amount of infrastructure or purchasing equipment in a short
period of time will definitely impact the maintenance system and management system. The
impact includes an increase in failure rate, an increase in safety accidents, and a decline in
service levels.
2. Enhance training system and improve staff quality.
Enhance the company's own training institutions, including the establishment of
supervisors in the company's management and the establishment of training centers in the
region and the formation of routine employee training arrangements. The frequency and
depth of staff training should be increased in daily operations and long-term planning.
3. Improve data quality
Both the accuracy and accessibility of accident information need to be improved,
including improving the content of accident reports and publishing accident information to
the public. The disclosure of accident information does not spread panic among the public.
On the contrary, timely and accurate provision of accident information is beneficial to
improving safety. And timely update of train operation information is an important content
of customer service.
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8.1.3 Theoretical Contribution
First of all, the study verified that the complex network can be applied to the analysis of
High-Speed Rail accidents. By decomposing High-Speed Rail accidents into event chains,
a directed network is modeled. Then to use the mathematical characteristics of the network,
such as degree, strength, average shortest path length and clustering coefficient, to analyze
the accident, describe the logical relationship between the accident factors, and find out the
key accident factors. The basic analysis steps of the above complex network models have
been verified in the High-Speed Rail safety research in this paper, and succeeded.
Furthermore, the damage degree of the accident is included in the analysis
framework. The weighted directional network is upgraded to dual-weighted directional
network, by adding a second weight. This makes the description and analysis of the
accident by the complex network more comprehensive.
Additionally, it has been proved during the research that the success of the analysis
method of complex network systems depends on sufficient data. In the study, some network
features could not be calculated due to the lack of sufficient data. For example, we tried to
compare the clustering coefficient of different years, but failed because the data in most
years was insufficient to support the calculation.
Last of all, five years of accident cases have added a large number of empirical
cases to complex network analysis models. Through case analysis, especially the case
analysis by year, we have a more comprehensive understanding of the limitations of
complex network models. Complex network models also rely on adequate data support like
other models. In the case of insufficient data, the mathematical characteristics of complex
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networks cannot be fully utilized, which will affect the final analysis results. This is proved
by the analysis of the clustering coefficient in this paper.

8.2 Future Research
8.2.1 Methodology
1. Dual-Weighted Method
The parameters shown in Table 3.1.3 for weighting according to the severity of the
accident are my assumptions. Whether these values are reasonable requires further study.
2. Modeling Method.
The first step of causation network modeling is to extract the cause of the accident.
The extraction process does not have a unified standard, and it completely depends on the
researcher's experience and knowledge. How to make the extraction of accident causes
universally accepted is a potential research topic.
8.2.2 Research Topic
1. Extensive research
This study only selected one of the eighteen regional management agencies in the
Chinese railway network for analysis. China has the world's largest High-Speed Rail
network, and great geographical characteristics, economic and cultural characteristics
diversity of these 18 regions. These all affect the construction and operation of High-Speed
Rail. It is hoped that the follow-up study can extend the scope of the study to other regions,
or the nationwide High-Speed Rail system. To make the safety situation of China's High157

Speed Rail more comprehensively studied, this not only has important academic
achievements, but also is inestimable for the value of life and economy.
2. Mining data
The data of current research is still limited, and some research results are not
complete. For example, the analysis of clustering coefficient in some years is lack of
sufficient data support. Continuous data mining is required by subsequent research.
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Appendix A
CASUSAL FACTORS (RAIB)

The causal factors in this appendix are extracted from the research results of RAIB railway
accidents. The factors in the original text include human factors, equipment factors,
environmental factors, management factors and accident factors. In addition to accident
factors, the other four types of factors are directly cited in this doctoral dissertation to
analyze the accident and construct the accident causal network in Chapter 5.
Table A.1 Human Factors
Factor
Shunter’s operation Mistake
Driver failed to Apply Emergency brake
Conductor’s Mistake
Driver’s operation Mistake
Track Maintainer’s inadequate Maintenance
Rail line inspector did not check out problems in time
Worker was working in danger conditions
Track worker’s negligence
Passenger fell from platform
Dispatcher’s Mistake
Train driver unable to stop the train
Level crossing watchman’s Mistake
Train Maintainer’s inadequate Maintenance
Pedestrians/car on the line in danger
Train driver drove when tired
Train driver drove Higher than the permitted speed
Signaler’s wrong command
Staff insufficient braked the train
Staff’s negligence
Staff left Machine/goods/material on the track
Source: Zhou, 2015.
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Code
H01
H02
H03
H04
H05
H06
H07
H08
H09
H10
H11
H12
H13
H14
H15
H16
H17
H18
H19
H20

Table A.2 Equipment and Machine Factors
Factor
Locomotive failure
Track damaged
Power supply failure
Signal displayed false
Train Minor damaged
Ineffective drainage
The risk of the line
Train seriously damaged
Risk of signal system
Train’s signal system failure
The Automatic operation of the
crossing failure
Railway tunnel was unsafe
Wagon failure
Uneven loading of the wagon
Track circuit failure
Turnout failure
Pantograph fell
Train’s window broken
Railway bed failure
Train fire
Electrical failure
Train wheel failure
Collapsing of soil
Signal Equipment failure
Losing traction power
Train delayed
Train technical failure

Code
Factor
EM01 Train started with door open
EM02 Train braking system failure
EM03 Container train failure
Design defect of locomotive
EM04 component
EM05 A system fault on the set of train door
EM06 Crossing operating failure
EM07 Train passed red signal
EM08 Ineffective handbrakes on the wagon
EM09 Train’s unbraked condition
EM10 Bridge failure
EM11
EM12
EM13
EM14
EM15
EM16
EM17
EM18
EM19
EM20
EM21
EM22
EM23
EM24
EM25
EM26
EM27

Control center system failure
Overhead line failure
Container fell
Train door detaching
Container door open
Infrastructure damaged
Goods Moved out from wagon/train
Design defect of the track
Track gauge out of tolerance
The wagon overloaded
Unauthorized train Movement
Draw hook broken
Point was operated into wrong
situation
Information transmission failure
Hand points Mechanism failure
Parts of train failure

Source: Zhou, 2015.
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Code
EM28
EM29
EM30
EM31
EM32
EM33
EM34
EM35
EM36
EM37
EM38
EM39
EM40
EM41
EM42
EM43
EM44
EM45
EM46
EM47
EM48
EM49
EM50
EM51
EM52
EM53

Table A.3 Weather Factors
Factor
Rainy condition
Water (flood water)

Code
E01
E02
Wind
E03
Freezing temperatures
E04
Snowy condition
E05
Fallen trees on the line E06
Fallen big stone
E07
Fallen ice
E08
Fallen rubble
E09
Low Adhesion condition E10
Fallen concrete debris
E11
Fire
E12
Source: Zhou, 2015.

Table A.4 Management Factors
Factor

Code
Inadequate safety Education for workers
M01
Inadequate safety precautions
M02
Weak Management
M03
Poor travel Management and Emergency handling M04
Not sufficient inspection and supervision
M05
Weak Maintenance system
M06
Source: Zhou, 2015.
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Appendix B
CHINA GENERAL ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION (2007)

The accident classification in this appendix is the source of the accident type code in
Chapter 5. The following content is excerpted from "Railway traffic accident investigation
and handling rules":

Article 12. In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a
major accident, it is a general Class A accident:
A1. Two people were killed.
A2. Serious injuries of 5 or more and 10 or less.
A3. Cause direct economic losses of more than 5 million yuan and less than 10 million
yuan.
A4. Conflicts, derailments, fires, explosions, and collisions in trains and shunting
operations, resulting in one of the following consequences:
A4.1 One line of busy trunk line or single line train is interrupted for 3 hours or more and
6 hours or less, and the double line train is interrupted for 2 hours or more and 6 hours or
less.
A4.2 One line of other lines or single line breaks for more than 6 hours and 10 hours, and
the double line train is interrupted for 3 hours or more and 10 hours or less.
A4.3 Passenger trains are delayed for more than 4 hours.
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A4.4 Passenger train derailed 1 vehicle.
A4.5 passenger train picks up more than 2 vehicles in the middle.
A4.6 passenger car scrapped 1 vehicle or broke more than 2 vehicles.
A4.7 locomotive broke more than one.
A4.8 More than one vehicle was broken in the EMU.
A4.9 freight train derailed more than 4 vehicles and less than 6 vehicles.

Article 13. In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a
general Class A accident, it is a general Class B accident:
B1. Caused one death.
B2. Serious injury to 5 people or less.
B3. Direct economic losses of more than 1 million yuan and 5 million yuan.
B4. Conflicts, derailments, fires, explosions, and collisions in trains and shunting
operations, resulting in one of the following consequences:
B4.1 The busy trunk line was interrupted for more than 1 hour.
B4.2 Other lines are interrupted for more than 2 hours.
B4.3 Passenger trains are delayed for more than one hour.
B4.4 Passenger train picks up one vehicle in the middle.
B4.5 passenger car broke 1 vehicle.
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B4.6 locomotives broke.
B4.7 freight train derailed more than 2 vehicles and less than 4 vehicles.

Article 14 In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a
general Class B accident, it is a general Class C accident:
C1. Train conflict.
C2. Freight train derailment.
C3. Train fires.
C4. Train explosion.
C5. The train collided.
C6. Issue the train to the occupied area.
C7. Connect to the train to the occupied line.
C8. Not ready to connect and send trains.
C9. Unsuccessful or wrongly occluded to send trains.
C10. The train rushes into the signal or crosses the police.
C11. The rolling stock slips into the section or station.
C12. The locomotive and vehicle in the train are broken, the wheels are cracked, and the
brake beam, the pull-down lever, the crossbar and other components fall off.
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C13. Collision of light vehicles, trolleys, construction machinery, machinery, protective
fences and other equipment and facilities, or road materials, carcasses, falling rocks.
C14. Contact wire contact wire is broken, rebared or collapsed.
C15. Close the angled plug door to release the train or close the angled plug door during
operation.
C16. Damage to driving equipment during train operation.
C17. During the operation of the train, the equipment and facilities, loading of goods
(including bag, mail), loading of reinforcement materials (or equipment) exceed the limit
(including exceeding the approved size of the telegraph by the over-limit cargo) or falling.
C18. Vehicles loaded with over-contained goods are classified into trains by vehicles
carrying regular cargo.
C19. Electric locomotives and EMUs are electrified to enter the power outage area.
C20. Error supply power to the catenary of the power outage section.
C21. The electrified section climbs the roof and delays the train.
C22. Passenger train separation.
C23. Locomotive vehicles that have collided or derailed are not inspected and certified into
trains.
C24. No dispatching order construction, over-range construction, over-range maintenance
operations.
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C25. Missing, wrong, leaking, misdirected dispatch commands cause the train to run at
over speed.

Article 15 In the case of one of the following circumstances, if it does not constitute a
general Class C accident, it is a general Class D accident:
D1. Shunting conflict.
D2. Shutdown and derailment.
D3. Squeeze turnout
D4. Shutdown and collision.
D5. Wrong or not timely signal to cause the train to stop.
D6. Wrong driving certificate or departure train.
D7. The shunting operation touches the derailer, the protection signal, or the unprotected
signal.
D8. Freight train separation.
D9. Construction, overhaul, and cleaning equipment delay trains.
D10. The operator violates labor discipline and work discipline to delay the train.
D11. Abuse of the emergency brake valve to delay the train.
D12. Unauthorized departure, driving, parking, wrong passage or passing in the interval.
D13. Train pull iron shoes to drive.
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D14. Missing, wrong, leaking, misdirected dispatching commands delay trains.
D15. Mishandling, using the driving equipment to delay the train.
D16. Use light vehicles, trolleys and construction machinery to delay trains.
D17. The train tail device shall be installed and the train shall not be installed.
D18. The train and mail loading and unloading operations delay the train.
D19. Electric locomotives and EMUs enter the contactless network line incorrectly.
D20. Workers on the train throwing objects outside to cause personal injury or equipment
damage.
D21. The failure of the driving equipment is delayed by more than one hour for the
passenger trains in this column, or the freight trains of this train are delayed for more than
2 hours; the delay of fixed equipment affects the normal driving for more than 2 hours
(only on the main line).
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